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GUNT PRESIDENT'S DEFEAT IN EAST MAY FORCE POLITICAL SOLUTION

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3373, 29 Mar 82 pp 48, 49

[Article by Mark Doyle]

[Text]

MARCH 15 was to have marked the beginning of negotiations for national reconciliation in Chad. In fact it marked the heaviest fighting in the east of the country for many months. The March 1 OAU ceasefire date was not respected. Consequently, the other recommendations of the OAU Committee — agreement of a constitution and legislative and presidential elections by the end of June — look increasingly unrealistic.

The latest clash between the GUNT (Transitional Government of National Unity) and FAN (Armed Forces of the North) took place in and around Oum Hadjer, the strategically important oasis town between N'Djamena and Abéché. Habré first took the town at the end of December, as part of his campaign that followed the Libyan withdrawal. It was briefly retaken earlier this year by GUNT forces; but armed with his windfall of Libyan arms and ammunition, particularly from Abéché, Habré retook the town in late February. "Military disorganisation," according to the Vice-President of the GUNT, Colonel Kamougué (both among GUNT factions and between GUNT and OAU forces) was the cause of the loss. A GUNT offensive to recapture Oum Hadjer was prepared and was launched on March 13. It was a spectacular failure, according to all reports reaching N'Djamena, notwithstanding the fact that President Weddeye had been in personal command at the eastern front.

Over 100 GUNT troops were killed in the attempt on Oum Hadjer, and at least as many injured. FAN claimed over 40 prisoners from the battle. Habré has also

consolidated his hold on Amdam to the south-east of Oum Hadjer. Habré and his sympathisers thus control strategic points stretching from Am Timam in the south to Faya Largeau in the north. While GUNT forces have been preoccupied in the east FAN have been moving south from Faya Largeau to Koro Toro. True to his form as an accomplished diplomatist as well as an effective general, Habré has conducted this two-pronged move towards N'Djamena without directly engaging the OAU peace-keeping forces.

Following this rout President Weddeye has changed his position vis-à-vis a possible United Nations intervention in the crisis. It is not clear as yet whether this would involve UN logistical or financial support for the OAU forces (whose mandate ends June 30) or whether it would involve actual UN troops. In either case President Weddeye, judging by past positions, would insist the intervention was "military" and not "political". President Weddeye's objections to the OAU force, apart from the fact that their ambivalent mandate precludes direct contact with Habré, is that their attitude is one of making a "protectorate" of Chad. This attitude was underlined after the *ad hoc* Committee tacitly recognised Habré as a major factor; in February the "five wise men" (from Kenya, Nigeria, Guinea, Zaire and the CAR) called for negotiations between GUNT and FAN. The OAU had, thereby, implicitly watered down its recognition of the GUNT as the unifying power in Chad. On his return to N'Djamena from Nairobi President Weddeye said: "It is the Chadian

people who lend legitimacy to the GUNT and not a collection of pro-imperialist countries". The Committee's recommendations for a ceasefire and elections were considered an "insult" and, according to the President, were a reversal of previous OAU policy.

The recent military defeats, however, have forced President Weddeye's hand as regards foreign support for his shaky amalgam of factions. Sudan, which continues to give military and diplomatic succour to Habré, recently reported that GUNT emissaries had been despatched to African countries and beyond in a search of arms. Recent reports in the French press that Paris had reneged on its military agreements to the GUNT are unsubstantiated and financial support to pay N'Djamena's civil servants (about £200,000 per month) continues. However, the French aid is apparently insufficient, even when added to OAU military support, and President Weddeye has sent a delegation to Nairobi to inform President Moi (the current chairman of the OAU and of the *ad hoc* Chad Committee) that an appeal to the UN would have the GUNT's reluctant blessing.

In addition to the steady supply of arms Habré continues to obtain via the Washington-Khartoum-Cairo axis, he has recently captured large caches from withdrawing Libyan and retreating GUNT troops. It is difficult to conceive of a "military" solution large and effective enough to resist Habré's advance, even with possible UN support. On the other hand it is quite unrealistic to posit "political" solutions such as a ceasefire or elections, whilst GUNT steadfastly refuses to join a Round Table with Habré.

The UN initiative could be interpreted as a face-saving admission that talks with Habré are inevitable. Such an interpreta-

tion would tie in with one of the few conciliatory notes struck in recent diplomatic postures; at the beginning of this month the GUNT Vice-President said, when questioned about negotiations with Habré, "Time will tell. We are but men. If for just a single moment the situation were to go against the government we would meet and take the necessary decisions."

Refugees of the war

Meanwhile, some of the Chadians who have fled from the war in the south and west of the country have been given a final ultimatum by the authorities in Cameroon to either return to N'Djamena or settle in a transit camp further south in Cameroon. The refugee camp at Kousséri, across the river from N'Djamena, has been closed by Cameroonian soldiers in a "firm but fair" manner, according to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Yaoundé. A repatriation programme had been in operation since August last year. Under pressure from the GUNT, who are aware that many of the refugees at Kousséri were supporters of the FAN, the Cameroonian and Nigerian governments gave the refugees a choice. By the time the Cameroonian soldiers moved in last week around 20,000 refugees were still in the camp. UNHCR reported that 5,000 opted to return to N'Djamena. Some of the rest are making their way to another camp at Poli, about 300 miles south, close to the Nigerian border with Cameroon. Others reportedly made their way to Nigeria.

Should Habré's forces reach N'Djamena the refugee situation may change; sympathisers of FAN may wish to return to N'Djamena. But by the same logic many others would be made stateless, homeless or worse.

BRIEFS

DELEGATION TO VISIT NEW DELHI/DPRK--Within the framework of the bonds of friendship and cooperation between the Congolese Labor Party [PCT] and the Korean Labor Party, a PCT delegation left Brazzaville today for India at the invitation of the Korean Party to attend an international seminar on the pu o ohjzsot budgets which is being organized by the international committee of the (?budget) institute from 9 to 11 April 1982 in New Delhi. The Congolese delegation is being led by Comrade (Jean-Royet Chiboma), a member of the Central Committee and director of the school for party cadres and includes Comrades Joseph (Chicker) and Leopold (Taki), both members of the party. At the end of the seminar, the Congolese delegation will go to the DPRK where it will attend the 70th birthday celebrations of Comrade Kim Il-song. [Text] [AB011536
Brazzaville Domestic Service in French 1245 GMT 1 Apr 82]

CSO: 4719/789

POLICE ENLISTMENT BOARD DISSOLVED IMMEDIATELY

AB052055 Accra Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 5 Apr 82

[Text] The enlistment board of the people's police service has been dissolved with immediate effect. Its responsibilities are to be taken over by the chief officer of the police training school with the assistance of the examination authorities. This was among a number of measures announced by the Inspector General of Police [IGP], Mr Kugblenu, at the inauguration of the defense committees of the police depot and the police band in Accra today. He explained that the move has become necessary because for some time now the enlistment board has not been functioning properly. He said a committee would soon be set up to advise him on the various aspects of police administration, and also help him in taking major decisions on the police service.

Mr Kugblenu disclosed that henceforth, all policemen would enjoy pension benefits.

He declared Saturday as police communal working day. He made it clear that People's Defense Committees [PDC] are part of police administration, and must therefore be accorded the fullest cooperation.

In his inaugural address, the secretary for interior, Mr Johnny Hansen, announced that the government would soon set up a separate economic intelligence unit within the police service to monitor the country's economy. He said this would ensure that cheats are completely eliminated from the system. He asked policemen to play a very progressive role in this field and also contribute effectively to the utilization of the country's resources.

Mr Hansen asked the policemen to understand their role in the revolution which is to defend, and not to harass people. He asked the IGP to take immediate steps to remedy anomalies in the police service.

A representative of the PNDC disclosed that the government would soon come out with a people's socioeconomic order which would cater for the food problems of the people. He called on the PDC's to ensure the success of the revolution.

CSO: 4700/1046

BRIEFS

'TRUE PICTURE' REPORT URGED--Diplomatic missions in the country have been advised to give the true picture of events in the country to the outside world. This is because it is the only way to tell the story of Ghana's revolution. The advice was given by the provisional national defense council secretary for the western region, Dr Appiah, when he addresses members of the people's armed forces and the police People's Defense Councils [PDC's]. At Prestea, near Takoradi, after joining them to clear a 10-acre farm, Dr Appiah said the country's army and civilian personnel have proved a united front to carry on the holy war to a successful end. He said Ghanaians are determined to guard their newly won freedom by taking their destiny into their own hands. Dr Appiah said the revolution is committed to finding a solution to the problem of hunger. He called on the army and the police to join the civilians to fight the common enemy of the people. [Text] [AB031425 Accra Domestic Service in English 1300 GMT 3 Apr 82]

PEOPLE'S COMPLAINT BUREAUS--People's Complaint Bureaus are being set up at information centers throughout the country to receive views and complaints from the general public. To this end, all district information officers have been directed to liaise directly with the national secretariat of the People's Complaint Bureaus. A statement from the provisional national defense council secretary for information, Mr Ato Austin, said the setting up of the people's bureaus is to revolutionize the means of collecting and disseminating information among the various communities. The statement said the Ministry of Information has made available free set radios, batteries and bicycles for the assignment, and the information officers are to direct their requests for logistic support to the national secretariat of the People's Complaints Bureaus. [Text] [AB030915 Accra Domestic Service in English 0700 GMT 3 Apr 82]

CLOSING OF HAGUE EMBASSY APPEALED--The Ghana-Netherlands Friendship Association has appealed to the Provisional National Defense Council to reconsider its decision to close down the Ghana Embassy at the Hague alongside others as a move to reduce the country's expenditure on its foreign missions. In its petition to the council and its secretary for foreign affairs, the association said a certain look at the Ghana-Netherlands relations over the years would indicate that the two countries should open their doors to one another. The statement said at the moment, the Netherlands has 22 Dutch medical officers, 30 nurses and 10 other paramedical staff working in 16 hospitals and 7 health posts throughout the country. There are also 14 Dutch experts engaged in

educational and rural projects and agricultural extensions work in the country.
[Text] [AB060930 Accra Domestic Service in English 2000 GMT 6 Apr 82]

COMPANY BANK ACCOUNTS DEFROZEN--The Provisional National Defense Council has ordered the defreezing of the accounts of all companies whose assets and bank accounts had been frozen. The decision takes immediate effect. A statement by the council, however, said any such company which wishes to withdraw more than 12,000 cedis in 1 month to meet operational expenses must apply to a committee which has been established at parliament house in Accra. [Text]
[AB081420 Accra Domestic Service in English 1300 GMT 8 Apr 82]

CSO: 4700/1046

BRIEFS

LESOTHO 'INSURGENT' KILLED--Maseru--An insurgent of the Lesotho Liberation Army, the military wing of the exiled opposition Basutoland Congress Party, was shot dead by Lesotho security forces in the northern Mucha Buthe district on Thursday, the commander of the Lesotho Paramilitary Force, Major General J M Lekhanya announced yesterday. He said the man was killed when three LLA insurgents, who had crossed into Lesotho from Qua Qua, were intercepted at about 3 pm yesterday. The two others escaped and fled back into Qua Qua. The general also said that a quantity of arms and ammunition, LLA literature and herbs were captured by the Lesotho forces in the encounter. In another incident early yesterday morning, LLA insurgents tried to blow up electric pylons at Marakabei in the Butha Buthe district near the Lesotho-South Africa border. The power lines were slightly damaged, General Lekhanya said. Radio Lesotho said the two incidents "again marked the continuing onslaught of subversive activities directed against us from South Africa." [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Apr 82 p 13]

CSO: 4700/1033

LIBERIA

BRIEFS

EXECUTIVE PAVILLION EMPLOYEES FINED--Two employees of executive pavillion were on Thursday fined \$50 each by PRC [People's Redemption Council] Deputy Speaker Lt Col William S. Brew for negligence of duty. According to a capitol building release, the two men, Samuel Buyo and Ben Bukleh, refused to perform their duties because they were not paid \$40 for an information program of the [name indistinct] student union on Saturday, 27 March. The program was attended by Lt Col William S. Brew and other high ranking officials of government, the release said. [Text] [AB040813 Monrovia Radio ELWA in English 1600 GMT 3 Apr 82]

CSO: 4700/1041

EKWUEME ADDRESSES ANTI-APARTHEID CONFERENCE IN UK

ABi21236 Lagos NAN in English 1205 GMT 12 Mar 82

[By James Bello]

[Text] London, 12 Mar (NAN)--Nigeria has again emphasized its preparedness to use every weapon and means at its disposal to fight and eliminate racism and colonialism in Africa and the world over.

Speaking at the opening of the anti-apartheid conference on Southern Africa in London last night, the vice president, Dr Alex Ekwueme, told more than 3,000 delegates that he had come to underscore the deep concern which the government and people of Nigeria feel at the unrelenting practice of apartheid by the white minority racists in South Africa.

He warned that the world could not for long endure the policy of half-slave, half-free, cautioning that all the signals from South Africa were pointing to nothing but explosion unless they were quickly reversed.

The vice president declared: This is the time for every man, every organization, every nation to stand up and be counted on the side of the struggling African nations, many of which have overstretched their very meager resources in the fight for independence, freedom, and [words indistinct].

Dr Ekwueme stressed that the greatest need of the African continent today was to get rid of discrimination, subjugation and exploitation, and called on all those who regard Africa as a friend to come to our aid in this historic struggle.

He called for intensified (?actions against) apartheid, including diplomatic, economic and military operations as might be necessary from time to time.

Addressing the conference, the chairman of the UN anti-apartheid committee, Nigeria's permanent representative to the United Nations, Alhaji Maitama Sule, called on the Western nations to join forces with (?other) nations in assisting the South African people to abandon the bitter legacy of racism and build a just society.

He said that the time had come for them to choose between friendship with the rest of Africa and amoral policy of collaboration with apartheid, reminding them that trade with independent African countries was seven times their trade with South Africa.

Also speaking, the commonwealth secretary general, Shridath Ramphal, condemned all forms of sporting links with racist South Africa.

The vice president, Dr Ekwueme, will later deliver a keynote address to the conference on Southern Africa--the African perspective.

CSO: 4700/956

KORO SALLAH DISCUSSES ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CONFEDERATION ON GAMBIA

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3373, 29 Mar 82 pp 851-853, 855-858

[Article by Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill]

[Text]

WHAT does the confederation mean for the Gambian peasantry?

A: The conditions of the peasantry of the Gambia, over 80 per cent of the population, is going to worsen because there is going to be an intensification of their exploitation. The condition of the Senegalese peasantry is well known: the over-taxation of peasants by the state, underpayment of groundnut producers, the defrauding of the peasantry by the Senegalese bureaucracy. The annexation of The Gambia will mean the transfer of this extra burden on to the Senegalese peasantry to the Gambian one. Cashcrop prices will be reduced. Secondly, instead of the former cash payments here, this will be delayed by promissory notes. The increasing corruption of state marketing of groundnuts in Senegal will be transferred to The Gambia. Taxation of The Gambian peasantry will be raised to be at par with the taxation of the Senegalese peasantry.

Expropriation of peasants

Again, the expropriation of land experienced by Senegalese peasantry in the past ten years, both by the Senegalese state, foreign agricultural interests in Senegal and the joint state and private agricultural sector in Senegal, will be transferred to The Gambia. This is shown in the immediate interests of the Senegalese to dam the Gambia river so that the Senegalese state

and their agents are going to be involved in large-scale commercial farming involving the expropriation of the Gambian peasantry. The dam will flood large parts of The Gambia, meaning resettling people, some even outside The Gambia's borders. The immediate benefits of this irrigation will be taken over by the rich Senegalese bureaucrats and agro-industrialists.

Q: For what kind of agricultural production?

A: This will be mainly for export markets. In Senegal you have American, and Libano-Syrian "ranches", rice plantations controlled by the French, it will be the same in our country. The peasants' land will be taken and they will be pauperised, employed in these fields, not for food production for the population but for exports to Europe and the Americas.

Q: Where does smuggling come in the economics of confederation?

A: Between 40 to 60 per cent of goods imported into The Gambia are smuggled out. This is controlled by a political-bureaucrat-businessman Mafia in The Gambia. Their interests will be immediately affected. But then, the principal interest of the Senegalese state is the breaking of this re-exporting into Senegal. That country's neo-colonial light industrial base is fairly developed, but it needs a market. The Gambia, as an annexed region of Senegal is going to serve as a market area.

Senegal used to be the "metropole" of French colonialism in West Africa. The French began to experiment with import-substitution industry, and Senegal used to

be the centre of production in French West Africa for cigarettes, textiles and other things. But with the coming of so-called independence in francophone West Africa, many of these other states began their own import-substitution on a smaller-scale for their own domestic markets, and Senegal lost a lot of this market.

Bureaucratic appetites

Also because of the bureaucracy after independence squandering much of the state's gains, because of the bureaucracy's increasing appetite, the peasantry had little, so the peasantry could buy little, and the market narrowed. The Senegalese market also became more sensitive to goods smuggled from The Gambia since this meant less goods manufactured in Senegal were bought by Senegalese. In 1968 Jean Collin (the Finance Minister) when he presented the budget accused the Gambians of being a nation of smugglers and blamed us for the chaos in their economy. The fact that Senegalese merchant importers must have goods standing unsold because their market was being penetrated by smuggled goods from The Gambia became more marked.

Then there was the smuggling of peanuts to the other side. Senegalese peanuts produced on Senegalese soil, with agricultural machinery probably loaned by ONCAD, was being sold in The Gambia because of the hard time the Senegalese peasants have with ONCAD: receiving promissory notes for their produce; these notes can take about six months. This is a deliberate deal by ONCAD to impoverish them because then they are left in the hands of the usurers. The peasants would rather get into The Gambia and sell these nuts, so there was also an increase in the smuggling of groundnuts into The Gambia.

Shortages of goods

So not only the merchants suffered from the smuggling, but also the state, in that ONCAD could not fulfil its external trade obligations. Because of these two factors there has been growing economic interest in Senegal to integrate the economies of the two countries.

Q: What about the Gambian side of things?

A: In fact, over the last three years one of the bitterest things that contributed to the heightening of political tension was the shortage of goods. There was no one day in The Gambia since 1979 when there was not a shortage of one of the basic items that the people use daily: if there was oil, then there was no rice; if there was rice, there was no tomato; if there was tomato, there wouldn't be cement or other building materials. And people saw that there were warehouses filled up with all these goods but they were not meant for Gambian consumers. Over the last two years even in the local papers there were complaints that Gambians going to Gambian businessmen to buy goods were refused unless they paid in CFA or other foreign currencies, and at prices very much over the price controls.

This thing became aggravated in June, the month of Ramadan, when over 80 per cent of Gambians respect as Muslims this Muslim fast. This is also the time when consumption of these basic goods is concentrated to one time of the day — the evening — and therefore the consumer population is more sensitive to shortages at such a time. This contributed a great deal to even the growing resentment against the Jawara government. The month of June for example, there was no sugar or rice, cement has been in short supply for months. The shortage of building materials, for example, also meant the unemployment of many labourers, building workers, and many people dependent on them.

Q: What is going to happen to the contraband trade? In whose interest is it to stop it, and in whose interest to continue?

A: In the short run, the imports into The Gambia continue, the Senegalese state is losing because the smuggling is still going on, only its control is changing hands. In the long run, the Gambian state is going to be affected by this loss of revenue from import duties because of the effective annexation. Also the interests of the Libano-Syrian, and Gambian merchants will be affected. On the Senegalese side, the state is going to benefit in the long run, not now, in the application of the economic side of this annexation.

The contraband cannot be limited only to imported goods. There are agricultural products. And until the unification of the pricing system of agricultural products, the flow continues. Again, control of the contraband in the agricultural products sector has

also changed. In the long run this sector is going to be neutralised again, and the elite of the Senegalese state will benefit through the taxation that goes to the state. The foreign-owned, locally-produced goods will also benefit through their increasing market profits from the Senegalese population, and through their exports from their captured market that is The Gambia. The foreign merchant class which is so big in Senegal, and who have considered the smuggling across the border as a big problem over the years, will benefit. The harmonisation of the two customs policies, and the effective end of smuggling means they will have the Senegalese market to themselves and not have to share it with smugglers. This is why some months ago they hurriedly presented petitions to the Parti socialiste calling for speedy integration of the economics of the two countries.

There is also the international economic aspect. This confederation is not limited to just The Gambia and Senegal, but it has this extension into the international market system. Those French note interests that control the neo-colonial economy of Senegal, the dominance of France will be felt in this newly-added territory of Senegal that is The Gambia.

Violent absorption

Q: How will confederation affect Gambian society?

A: We of the Movement for Justice in Africa believe that in the long run only unification among the peoples of Africa can safeguard our people and our interests. And even in these turbulent times of global tension, of threats of war, only unification of the African peoples will be able to safeguard our security. But there are unifications and unifications. The neo-colonial, violent absorption of The Gambia by Senegal doesn't benefit the people of either country. It doesn't bring about the African unity long dreamed of by our patriotic fathers. It only hinders it, because unity cannot come from above but from below.

Taking this so-called confederation brought about by the aggressive Diouf regime, neither the Senegalese nor Gambian peasantry benefit anything. The Gambian peasantry is very very familiar with the conditions of our brothers and sisters in Senegal. We are very aware of the seasonal

hunger in the months of June, July and August experienced by our people in Senegal leading to many deaths. We know how much Senegalese serfs suffer under money-minded, corrupt marabouts; we know how the peasantry over the decades have been so much exploited by the defunct ONCAD; we know how the Senegalese peasantry are forced to be paying taxes for services that are only promised but never delivered by the state; we know of the living conditions in the Senegalese countryside where there are no facilities built by the Senegalese state.

We know how Senegalese peasantry fill our hospitals in the countryside; we know how our brothers and sisters in Senegal have to be sending their kids, small girls who are supposed to be in school, how they are forced to come and slave in Gambian homes; we know how Senegalese lepers, handicapped people, beggars, roam our city because they have not been catered for by the Senegalese state; we know more than 70 per cent of the beggars and blindmen in Banjul come from Senegal . . . so we are very well aware of the conditions of living of our brothers and sisters in the Senegalese countryside. So we know what confederation means for us: we can see it in the lives of the Senegalese peasants.

Senegalese "refugees"

Even, from personal experience, over 70 per cent of prisoners in Gambian jails come from Senegal. The worsening conditions of Senegalese urban areas and the countryside that has forced them to migrate into Gambia and forced them into criminal activities. We know that 90 per cent of the prostitutes in The Gambia come from Senegal. We know that the bulk of the drivers in The Gambia, the bulk the apprentices who fill our transport garages, come from Senegal. The bulk of masons come from Senegal; our markets are filled with Senegalese, who because of the increasing crisis in Senegal have migrated to The Gambia. Over the past 20 years, about 90 per cent of the seasonal agricultural labour comes from Senegal.

We are not saying that the Gambian peasantry is better off. The intensification, the high rate of exploitation of the Senegalese peasantry is very, very clear.

Q: What effect has this influx of Senegalese labour had on the Gambian work-

force?

A: This has been disastrous because it has resulted in increasing unemployment of people who, before this increasing migration, were employed in the fields. With the coming of the taxi-drivers, mechanics, tailors, subvendors, farmers, our people become redundant, because these people will take any salary to be employed because they face starvation in their country.

In the past five years, there has been a high number of Senegalese peasantry who have come into The Gambia to settle as farmers to escape the agricultural marketing system and the high taxation of the peasantry that exists in Senegal. The Gambia has until now been a haven for the Senegalese who run from the increasing crisis there. It is not a haven for the Gambian peasantry, but they are slightly better off in this hell they both suffer from these two neo-colonial governments.

Q: You haven't explained why The Gambia imports far more consumer goods than its economy can absorb. What interests are served by this practice which fuels the balance of payments crisis?

A: For example, according to the Senegalese magazine *l'Afrique Nouvelle*, if over the last two or three years the number of television sets imported had been consumed only in The Gambia, then every household would have ten television sets. In fact more than 90 per cent of Gambian households don't have TV. So much of this is exported to not only Senegal but to other neighbouring countries by criminal-minded Gambian and Senegalese merchants who live on smuggling. This is done with the knowledge of the Gambian regime which cannot fail to realise that the widescale re-exportation of imported goods has been taking place. The Gambian government has also not tired of blaming foreign exchange shortages, deficit in trade, balance of payments problems for failing in its promise, for the stoppages in its projects and development programmes.

We have to go back and check on the neo-colonial role of the Gambian state, this tradition, this function inherited from the colonial state of catering as a market for European goods and providing cheap raw materials for European factories. The Gambian regime, through all its existence, has all the time been encouraging the increase in imports of luxury goods. The rate at which luxury goods imports have increased over the last years is more than tenfold the increase in basic goods that are really needed for the population.

Never mind that this is also done against the interest of a neighbouring state. It is a small elite of Gambians who gain from this. The majority of our people don't gain anything from this; in fact they lose. The increase in imports, and the decrease of legal exports means balance of payments problems, and always it is the bulk of the peasantry and the population who shoulder the problems derived from this.

Military superiority

Q: After the Senegalese came in how did over 1,000 Gambians end up in detention?

A: It was the military superiority of the Senegalese, and the disorganised nature of the resistance. Also there was the betrayal of the coup-makers who called on the people to continue the resistance, and left them there. There was the lack of a centre, there was no correct flow of information; even when the Senegalese came in many people did not know they were present. And when the Senegalese came in they considered the whole population as their enemy because they knew how popular the revolt was, how massive the resistance was, so they just arrested everybody.

The arrests and interrogations were done by the Senegalese. Many people who knew what the act of being captured was, who raised their hands and made no attempt to move as this would have meant being immediately shot by Senegalese soldiers, were taken first to the Senegalese embassy. People were first interrogated there in various rooms of the embassy and then taken to the police station. It was days after, when the Police Depot was captured that the detainees were transferred to the Depot.

Q: What was the attitude of the Senegalese soldiers towards Gambian government officials?

A: They showed a remarkable sense of disrespect for them because they knew that it was by their blood and sweat that the regime was reinstated. They felt that the Gambian state was already smashed.

Q: What kind of people were being detained by the Senegalese?

A: Most of them were ordinary people who had jubilated as a result of the coup. These included men, women, old people, and this was not limited only to the areas of fighting against the Senegalese — Banjul and the Kombos — but extended to remote villages such as Wuli, about 250 miles from Banjul.

There is the celebrated case of an 82-year-old man from Wuli who was arrested because he was jubilating.

It is important to understand that the crushing of this coup was also used to deal with political forces opposed to the regime. The regime has used this occasion to make mass arrests of all opposition forces, especially the legal opposition, members of the NCP in particular. People who opposed the regime, even 15 years ago were arrested, for example in the Saloum areas which are traditionally UP opposition since the early 60s. The bulk of those arrested who had nothing to do with this coup were members of the NCP. Militants of the NCP in all areas of the countryside were rounded up, because this was a good opportunity the regime used to destroy the bases of the popular opposition.

Bearing false witness

Q: Is this reflected in the people who have been tried so far?

A: Those people tried so far were said to have supposedly carried arms and ammunition. It is important to note those who are being used as witnesses against other people. Apai Sonko is a typical example of how a detainee has been promised his freedom on the condition as a false state witness against people detained, and principally against known members of the legal opposition. It is the same Apai Sonko who was instructed to implicate MOJA in this coup.

Q: How did he do that?

A: It is interesting to note that all the people arrested in October 1980 supposed to be carrying arms and ammunition, managing an unlawful society, their names were repeated in the statement by Apai Sonko when he said these names were among the list shown to him by Kukoi Samba Sanyang. But the list was never produced in the courts. The names of anybody known to be in the opposition could have been included.

Q: Do you know the seventeen people who have now been sentenced to death?

A: These people are not known, except one comedian — Aliou Sallah — who is known to the population. The rest are ordinary unemployed, or workers.

Q: Roughly 1,000 people are in detention, and roughly 100 have been tried. What do you think will happen to all the rest?

A: They are going to try them. It is important to note not only the trials and death sentences, but also that people have been dying in detention.

Q: You are saying that the *Gazette* list of detainees is incomplete?

A: It is incomplete because there are more than 1,500 said to have been detained, and there are different detention centres. Those who have been identified, those who were seen being arrested, they are the names mentioned.

Political function

Q: Do you think the trials are going to continue?

A: Yes, they will continue, they must continue not only for the sake of revenge, but also because the trials will play a certain political function for the Senegalese occupationists. Even under the neo-colonial regime of President Senghor, they have never trusted Jawara on this confederation and on Senegalo-Gambian relations. And President Diouf today doesn't trust Jawara either. They would rather do away with Jawara. They would rather have a Gambian leader who has never had the experience of being the leader of a sovereign nation. Also they know very well that the whole Gambian nation solidly opposes the so-called confederation. And that to have about a thousand people in The Gambia released, people who they don't trust, will be a grave danger to the security of their annexation, because these people any time in the future as their determination to resist strengthens will be very unreliable.

But at the same time, to get rid of these people, detainees in one way or another will have enormous social consequences that will not be good for them. So the thing the Diouf regime would like is to kill two birds with one stone, by letting the Jawara regime take the responsibility for all these prisoners, and thereby emptying it of all political credibility and making it the target of all the hatred of our people, and eliminating it to replace it with an administration that is easier to control.

Q: Why do you think leading opposition figures — Sheriff Dibba, Cheyassin Secka, Jibou Jagne — are detained but have not been brought to trial?

A: Sheriff Mustapha Dibba, leader of the National Convention Party, is detained

with Jibou Jagne, also a veteran opposition member, first from the United Party, later the NCP, and also the leader of the National Liberation Party, Cheyassin Secka. These people have not been brought to trial for many reasons, both Gambian and Senegalese.

On the Gambian side, the regime has no facts it can prove. It is easier to try an innocent peasant and sentence him than to try the leaders of popular opposition parties. So they are being kept to prolong the continuous neutralisation of the legal opposition so that the regime will not have any immediate open challenge with regard to the masses.

A vocal opponent

Secondly, Cheyassin is not a member of parliament but he was the principal defence lawyer for the MOJA members falsely charged and tried in 1980. And he has been a vocal opponent of the regime; he exposed the developing tendency towards fascism in the country in the 1980 interviews he had with *New African*. He explicitly forecast, as a result of his understanding of the working of the judicial system, that The Gambia was moving towards a political dictatorship.

On the Senegalese side, it is important to note that Dibba, by virtue of the fact that he was the principal opponent of any form of association with Senegal when he was vice-president for over ten years, becomes a principal target of the Senegalese occupation forces. For them, he signifies a big stumbling-block to the achievement of their strategy of annexation of The Gambia.

There is this plan for so-called elections in this country. With the release of these three principal personalities of the opposition, and the conducting of an internationally-supervised elections, there is no doubt that the Gambian masses would vote the whole clique of Jawara politicians out of power.

Q: Those elections are due for early May.

A: Note that under the conditions I have described above the elections to come are a mockery. But then, elections in our country have historically been a mockery.

In neo-colonial Gambia, like in most other African countries, elections have always been a farce. The use of intima-

tion, political rigging, the police and security forces, local chiefs and village headmen, the use of bribery and corruption, the threat of dismissal of workers, the secret use of thugs and the detention of people in the countryside, the use of the bureaucracy as a supervisor of these elections to see the return of the people in power, the lack of basic elements of democratic rights in these countries, has resulted in The Gambia since 1962 in election-rigging whenever there are elections. But as the years pass by, it has become increasingly difficult for the regime to rig elections.

So we believe the coming elections will be the last elections before the complete annexation of this country.

Q: What you are saying about the nature of democracy in The Gambia runs completely contrary to the image that has been projected all these years. How can you substantiate these allegations?

A: It is true the Jawara regime has been able to project a democratic profile to the outside world, but this is unknown to us inside The Gambia who have to experience the various incursions into our civil liberties and democratic rights. We have all the time been hearing that The Gambia is the haven of democracy, the Switzerland of Africa, centre for human rights, etc. But these are alien to our people who have known nothing over the past years in common with democracy and the respect for human rights and civil liberties. The Gambian state structure inherited from the colonial state machinery which was an apparatus for the conquest and oppression of our people, inherited without changes, definitely cannot create the base for any democracy in The Gambia.

For example over 80 per cent of our people live in the countryside and their life is controlled by chiefs and alkalos who are rural despots. Even corporal punishment is still being practised in the countryside by chiefs and community leaders like the alkalos against our people.

The economic conditions of democracy aside, taking aside the fact that there are gross inequalities in The Gambia which can be attributed to things inherited from colonial days, the undemocratic practice of the government is not reducing in the course of time; it is increasing. And The Gambia over the past years, even those semblances of democracy and civil liberties our people presumably enjoyed under colonial rule, have been eroded to the minimum. The Jawara regime creates the basis

for the coming of an autocracy where one man rules over the whole nation.

You could see this in the Progressive People's Party, in the way it executed its affairs, in its intolerance of internal dissent, the illegal dismissal way back in the '60s of Sheriff Cisse and his band of opportunists from inside the party; also the 1976 conflict with Sheriff Dibba and his band of opportunists, a relatively large bloc inside the party that was intolerantly brushed out because they were dissenting voices; the dismissal of chiefs in the '60s — the position of chieftaincy according to the Constitution is supposed to be apolitical, but all those chiefs who had not taken proper part in the consolidation of the PPP, who had not come out openly to support the PPP were thrown out of their positions.

Undemocratic regime

It could also be seen in the Societies Act of 1971 which violates our constitutional right to freedom of assembly; the Trade Union Amendment Act of 1976 when workers who struck legally were forced back to work by armed Field Force men after the crisis of the Walla salaries commission; it can also be seen in the banning of the Gambian workers the same year. The undemocratic nature of the Jawara regime again can be seen in the Ba Trawally case, when the Gambian journalist exposed the practice of slave labour in the rice farms in Barajelli, allegedly owned by people in high positions of authority in The Gambia. It can be seen in the unconstitutional and illegal ban of MOJA. It can be seen in the last two years in the systematic dismissals of all oppositionists in government positions, ranging from radio announcers, executive officers, to caretakers in provincial schools; the seizure of market stalls of prominent NCP supporters. It could be seen in the banning of NCP opposition meetings in the countryside by PPP alkalos and chiefs. It can be seen also in the general context of the fact of a lack of tolerance of debate and discussion of national issues. It can be seen, for example, when the ban on charcoal — which constitutes up to 50 per cent of the fuel energy that is used by Gambians — to suddenly ban it because of conservation reasons without first making it a national issue where everybody would have a right

to discuss, shows how intolerant it is. It can also be seen in the present so-called confederation issue: people are not allowed to discuss it, they are not allowed to have a referendum or any plebiscite, the government maintains it has the mandate of the people by having held about 30 meetings, where there were more armed Senegalese troops than listeners.

Q: You are the Gambian section of the Movement for Justice in Africa. How do you see your role in The Gambia in this state of emergency and confederation, and in the future?

A: At this period of time, MOJA as one of the most organised sections of the opposition, had all along been pointing out the dangers of Senegalese intervention and annexation of our country, and the unreliability of Jawara's democratic facade.

We believe we are now at the stage where the struggle for national democracy, a new type of democracy which will guarantee equal distribution of Gambian wealth and natural resources, the improvement of the living conditions of our people, an overall change in the structure of the economy so that economic activity will be pointed towards satisfying the basic needs of our people instead of existing as a satellite peripheral economy to satisfy the needs of the imperialist centre. This is the biggest problem which must be broken, the fact that we are a neo-colony. Today, even though our struggle has become harder, we believe the future is brighter because our people have over these last years accumulated a very valuable experience, even though it was very dear in terms of blood. We believe that the determination of our people to free ourselves from all forms of oppression is so strong that no force can break it.

Unnecessary bloodshed

We believe that our people will never accept this form of annexation masquerading under the name of confederation, and they will struggle. As said in the statement we recently released, we therefore see the major task that confronts us as now to recognise this opposition. We believe that, even though some see this as a difficult task, we don't think this will be a problem. We believe that in the long run victory is on our side.

We believe this tragedy our nation has

gone through, the unnecessary shedding of blood, can be avoided if the Senegalese troops are withdrawn from The Gambia, if all political prisoners are released, if this state of emergency is lifted, and if this campaign of terror unleashed on our people is stopped. We believe that a government of national consensus, freely, fairly and peacefully built, can be formed. We believe that the Jawara regime has been so discredited that it can no longer play a meaningful part in the future history of our country.

We believe that The Gambia, even though we are half-a-million people, has the possibilities of existing as a viable state; that our people can live under qualitatively more favourable conditions; that our economy can be so organised that our people do not need to linger in poverty and misery; that three out of every five of our babies do not need to die before the age of five; that our youth will not be sentenced to this level of degeneration where their lives are spent in smoking dope, hanging around hotel corners because of unemployment. Employment is the right of everybody and The Gambia is economically capable of doing this. We believe that the wealth that is produced in The Gambia belongs to the working people to share equally so there will be a meaningful life.

Our programme is a democratic programme; our platform is democratic; our struggle is for the implementation of democracy in The Gambia. Our organisation has survived the shock, and will continue to do so. We constituted the only opposition organisation in The Gambia that by our

tracts had warned against these developments, against the Senegalese, against the nature of the Jawara regime, before this coup. So we were prepared psychologically for this situation; we were better able to survive it than any other political organisation, even the ruling party itself.

We believe that the formation of the broadest possible front of all opposition groups, all Gambian patriots, for the liberation of our country is one of the most essential tasks of the day.

We seriously appreciate all the types of solidarity expressed by the Senegalese parties people and opposition parties for their Gambian brothers and sisters under these difficult conditions.

Finally, our movement has great confidence in the capacity of our people to go through the difficult times we are experiencing and finally defeat these neo-colonial expansionists, aggression against our people, remove this regime, and build in its place a democratic, peaceful, neutral Gambia, in the interests of the Gambian people, in the interests of democracy, and in the interests of world peace. And in this venture there is already indications of the determination of our people because since the arrival of these Senegalese expansionist forces in our country, our people have continued to take up new form of struggle against this situation. Every day, the unfavourable conditions are turning favourable. We have no doubt that in the very near future, the bankruptcy of the Gambian regime will be proved in the continued heroic struggle of the entire Gambian people.

TIME BEFORE GAMBIAN ELECTIONS 'CRUCIAL' FOR DAKAR, BANJUL

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3373, 29 Mar 82 p 850

[Article by Nana Humasi]

[Text]

THE VICE-PRESIDENT and Leader of Government Business in the Gambian House, Assan Musa Camara has formally dissolved Parliament. The House rose for the last time on March 11, to prepare for the General Elections announced for May. The outgoing House had been sitting since 1977 during which time it had put 97 Acts on the statute books, dealt with 1095 questions, and approved 67 resolutions, the most significant of which was that to establish the Confederation of Senegambia.

On the first day of the two-day sitting, the House had passed a motion to increase the representation of Chiefs in the House from four to five and the nominated membership from five to eight. The deposit for presidential candidates was kept at D2,500 despite calls for its increase. General and Presidential elections are to be held on separate dates.

One of the last items to receive attention in the current parliament's last days was a CFA2m. (D785,000) credit agreement with a French firm to rehabilitate and re-equip the country's telephone system. The House also ratified The Gambia's membership of the IFC, a branch of the IMF.

Opposition MP Mr Foday Makalo, heading the National Convention Party (NCP) bench in the absence in detention of party leader Sheriff Mustapha Dibba, called for an early trial for his detained colleagues. Makalo said continued delay could be interpreted as a tactic by government to prevent them from contesting the elections. He condemned the July 30 attempted coup against President Dawda

Jawara and pledged support for the current Five Year Development Plan.

The political career of a veteran came to end when during the session, Alieu Badara Njie, who is 80, announced his retirement after 22 years as an MP. Njie was a carry-over from the colonial period, and has held several key positions in Cabinet. In his valedictory address he said he was stepping down, despite his constituency's disapproval, to create avenues for younger politicians. Several members spoke with feeling of their years of association with Njie who said he would, however, continue to be active as a party adviser.

From a less conspicuous corner of the Government bench, ex-Finance Minister, Mohammadou Cadi Cham, exhorted the assembly to leave with minds absolutely clear about the benefits to The Gambia of the Senegambia Confederation. The union has not been forced on The Gambia by Senegal by advantage of size or military capability, he said, neither was it imposed by the events of July 30. Union, he said, was only natural for two countries with "our kind of politics and geography."

Three new faces present in House were Dr. Jabez Ayo Langley, the recently appointed Secretary-General, formerly Permanent Secretary Ministry of Economic Planning, Alhaji A. S. M'boob, the former Inspector General of Police now heading the Interior Ministry, and Bakary Darboe, who until his appointment as Minister of Information and Tourism, was the country's High Commissioner in Dakar, Senegal.

Curfew hours have been increased from

midnight to six in the morning.

Under the present state of affairs, the three most important issues for the ordinary Gambian are the economy, the law and confederation. While government reconstructs, it has attempted to reassure the citizenry by effecting important measures. The Senegalese soldier has practically withdrawn to sentry boxes at highway forked junctions, to tents at the entrance to Yundum International Airport, and behind low sandbags at Oyster Creek Bridge which keeps the capital in touch with the rest of the country.

All civil servants received between 10 per cent and 15 per cent salary increases in January; bars and public halls stay open until two hours before curfew; tourists troop the streets with cine-cameras; no "coup" arrests have been made since November.

Salary increases have not, however, come without problems. The price of a 50-kilo bag of rice has jumped from D50 (£12) to D71 (£17.60). Prices of cement, electrical appliances, and foodstuffs have also steadily risen over the last six months, by between 20 per cent and 35 per cent.

The Gambia Produce Marketing Board has spoken of a good groundnut season with the return of adequate rains last year. Despite problems with marketing the HPS

confectionery nuts, Deputy Director Lamin Juwara feels that the season could be described as healthy, compared with the droughts of the last five years.

The President has insisted on the due process of law in the trials of the detainees connected with the events of July 30. An observer close to the courts describes it as expensive, with the government coffers responsible for prisoners and foreign and local barristers, and there are still some 800 detainees to hear. Time is another factor disturbing the procedure. The State of Emergency will not be lifted until all cases have been heard; as a result the elections next month will be conducted under emergency.

The mean time, until the elections, will be crucial for both governments in Banjul and Dakar. In the 18th year of The Gambia's independence, President Jawara is only 58 years old. If the promised fair elections confirm his leadership, the confederation is guaranteed another five years at the end of which the People's Progressive Party would have celebrated its silver jubilee in leading The Gambia's Parliament and government. Any serious constitutional challenge to that would depend on the outcome when the tribunals hear the case of opposition National Convention Party leader Sherrif Moustapha Dibba, currently a detainee.

CSO: 4700/1036

SCHLEBUSCH SETS OFF 'POWER-SHARING' ROW

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Apr 62 pp 1, 2

[Article by Jaap Theron]

[Text]

THE Vice-State President, Mr Alwyn Schlebusch's reference yesterday to — and his definition of power sharing as "the power and the right to take part in decision-making which could result in legislation," — has caused a sensation in political circles.

Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the official Opposition, said "when the Vice-State President becomes embroiled in a raging party political dispute, we are faced with an intolerable situation".

Dr Andries Treurnicht, leader of the Conservative Party, took grave exception to Mr Schlebusch's statement that "no Minister or Deputy Minister who served with him (Schlebusch) between 1977 and 1979, could rightly allege that he did not support power sharing and the least of all Cabinet Ministers who either formulated or approved the decisions".

"I take the strongest exception to the allegation of Mr Schlebusch that no Nationalist Member of Parliament could rightly allege that he did not support power sharing," Dr Treurnicht said.

nicht said.

"I have never supported it," he stressed "and Mr B J Vorster has rejected it as well."

Mr Schlebusch made his statement last night in a speech at the official opening of the bi-annual meeting of the Junior Rapportraad of the Junior Rapportryersbeweging at the University of Pretoria.

He said it was now a time of crucial importance for the Afrikaner and therefore warranted an exceptionally balanced consideration.

There was no doubt in political circles that Mr Schlebusch had referred to the present split in the National Party, which he, in fact, compared with a similar split in 1934 when Dr D F Malan and General J B M Hertzog's paths separated. Although he himself at the time, supported Dr Malan, he yesterday indicated that General Hertzog was actually right at the time.

In his speech before the Junior Rapportryers Mr Schlebusch asked: "What is power sharing?"

"I don't find a constitutional definition for our particular circumstances.

"Consequently I would say that power

sharing, as far as State institutions are concerned, is the power and the right to take part in decision-making which could result in legislation," Mr Schlebusch said.

"What is important, is not power sharing per se, but to what extent it is structured or shared."

Mr Schlebusch said he himself followed Dr D F Malan when he broke away from Gen J B M Hertzog in 1934.

He said he was proud he had joined Dr Malan's minority group, but "the older I got, the more I understood Gen Hertzog's reasons and the bigger his stature grew in my opinion."

The Vice-State President, obviously referring to the present split in the NP, said: "The question on everybody's lips today is, do we have the Thirties over again and must the Afrikaner trek laager all over again?"

"If laager trek in our circumstances is the best method to counter threats, then we as nation, should, as soon as possible, shield ourselves behind pure Afrikaner Bulwarks, because certain threats are today much more serious than in 1934," he said.

He said one of the areas of defence against foreign pressure today was constitutional development for Whites, Coloureds and Asians.

Mr Schlebusch referred to the time when he was in the Cabinet and when he as Minister of the Interior was involved with the draft legislation in 1979 on the Contitution.

"It was general knowledge in the Vorster Cabinet that the 1977 Constitutional proposals contained elements of power sharing," he said.

He said he had gone out of his way "to explain to study groups (in Parliament) that the draft legislation contained elements of power sharing.

"The draft legislation went further than the 1977 proposals in so far as it provided for the Council of Cabinets to transfer further legislative powers to the Brown Parliaments, without the approval of a certain parliament.

"It also provided for the Council of Cabinets to draft and complete the legislative programme.

"No Minister or Deputy Minister or Member of the NP in Parliament who served during my time (as Minister) could rightly allege that he did not support power sharing, and the least of all Cabinet members who formu-

lated and/or approved it," he said.

He also said: "After all that had happened and that had by implication been promised, the Afrikaner especially could not shrink from a form of co-responsibility and co-decision-making."

Dr Slabbert said: "the Vice-State President is and should be above controversy.

"Power sharing is presently a concept right in the centre of a heated political debate.

"The Vice-State President now gives his view on what this concept means and motivates this by referring to his actions while he was an active politician.

"Those who differ from his interpretation cannot engage him in debate and we are at an obvious disadvantage.

Clarify

"There is an urgent need to clarify this situation immediately, otherwise a very unfortunate situation will arise where the office of the Vice-State President will increasingly become part of the current party political debate," Dr Slabbert said.

Dr Treurnicht said: "There were a few statements of Mr Schlebusch which were certainly not correct.

"The draft legislation to which he referred, was certainly not accepted unani-

mously by the caucus of the NP.

"After Mr Schlebusch had explained it to the caucus at the time, the discussions were curtailed by the Prime Minister's assurance that much time would be available in future to discuss the matter.

Ended

"With that assurance, the discussion of the issue which I myself still wanted to talk about, ended," Dr Treurnicht said.

"The idea that the draft legislation contained elements of power sharing was definitely not the standpoint of Mr Vorster, Mr M C Botha and of the present Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha.

"All three of them have specifically denied that there were elements of power sharing in the proposals when it was discussed in August 1977 in Cape Town," Dr Treurnicht said.

"The present Prime Minister last year rejected power sharing without qualifications."

Dr Treurnicht announced that the Conservative Party would discuss the standpoint of the Vice-State President at the earliest opportunity, including his "active participation in practical politics."

DEFENSE MINISTRY'S WHITE PAPER TABLED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Apr 82 p 7

[Text] **HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY.** — The Defence Force will be more and more dependent on alternative sources of manpower, such as White women and members of other population groups, according to a Government White Paper tabled yesterday by the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan.

The White Paper, on defence and armaments supply, says it is in the national interest that White men should no longer be utilised as the Defence Force's only manpower source.

"Therefore the SADF will be more and more dependent on other sources of manpower, such as White females and members of other population groups — and to involve these people in a meaningful manner their utilisation is already being based on programmed manpower development plans which extend to 1990."

Apart from national servicemen on whom compulsory service was imposed, the SADF had to compete for manpower on the open market.

At present the Permanent Force made up 28 percent of the full-time component of the SADF.

"It is planned to supplement the Permanent Force by utilising White males from the ranks of national servicemen to be employed mainly as leaders and training personnel for other population groups.

"This expansion is the most important of the whole manpower provisioning system for the fulltime force as the expansion of all other elements can only take place in proportion to the degree of success with which White leaders and control personnel can be recruited.

"As regards White females, efforts in the short term will be directed at expanding the Permanent Force. It is envisaged in the medi-

um term to increase the intake of female recruits for voluntary national service.

"A large-scale increase in the number of female recruits cannot however take place until the Permanent Force has been expanded to such an extent that the larger numbers can be accommodated.

An increase in the number of Coloured and Asian servicemen was also envisaged.

"As for Blacks, there are three categories — Permanent Force members, auxiliary service members and civilians. All service rendered by Blacks is voluntary.

"Black Permanent Force members are trained at 21 battalion at Lenz, near Johannesburg, where members of the defence forces of independent states are also trained.

"With the expectation of a multi-national group unit still to be established, Black members who belong to the combat element of the auxiliary service are divided into regional

units. These units will serve as the nucleus of the independent defence forces of the states concerned.

"The training of these members and the development of bases where they can be trained will make increased demands on the Defence Force with regard to finance as well as manpower but the advantage is that such defence forces will be able to contribute to the protection of their own territories.

"The establishment and expansion of Black regional units in South West Africa has been given priority over units in South Africa so that the inhabitants of SWA can make a greater contribution to their own protection.

"Black civilians serve in various capacities in the SADF and the possibility of placing as many of these people as possible in uniform is being investigated at present," the White Paper said.

Marxist-Leninist Ideology the Primary Threat

THE spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology remained the primary threat to the preservation of sovereignty and the survival of all the

nations of the free world, according to the White Paper on Defence and Armaments supply.

A principle of com-

munist ideology as expounded by successive Soviet leaders had always been that there could be no world peace before their doctrine

had taken root all over the world.

In spite of the tremendous expansion of its military force it would appear that the

USSR was not at present planning a large-scale conventional war against the West.

"But the USSR's direct intervention in Afghanistan, as well as its attitude towards the developments surrounding the people's revolt in Poland, indicate that Russia is prepared to enforce and extend its interests nearer home with its own military force.

"In view of the mineral wealth of Southern Africa the USSR strives to extend its influence to this area by assisting terrorist organisations such as Swapo and the ANC by creating unrest and exploiting this situation and by making use of surrogate forces such as the Cubans."

The latter were being supplemented increasingly by East Germans.

"During the past two years the aims of the Soviet Union and its allies vis-a-vis Southern Africa in general, and South Africa in particular, have become more apparent."

Referring to the onslaught on South Africa the White Paper said the influence of the Soviets and the Third World in the sphere of politics, diplomacy and propaganda was reflected in various world and regional organisations with the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.

"In its indirect onslaught against Western capitalism Soviet strategy is aimed at denying essential natural resources to the West.

"It is therefore in the interests of the Soviets to destabilise the situation in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East and South America, as well as to maintain, by means of its presence on land and at sea, a position of power vis-a-vis the important oil supply routes to the West.

"For this purpose the

Soviet is stepping up its exploitation of turbulent situations in the areas concerned and is using surrogate forces such as Cubans in Ethiopia and also Cuban influence in South America.

"To achieve its expansionist aims the USSR maintains a considerable naval presence in the Indian Ocean and has already succeeded in extending essential facilities for its naval units in this area.

"UN partiality towards Swapo was clearly revealed in the negotiating process on South West Africa while this world body's handling of RSA and SWA matters is proof of open hostility against the RSA.

"In many cases this attitude of the UN is a result of OAU influence.

"It is the aim of the USSR to tie down the SA Defence Force by means of a protracted terrorist war in SWA, while at the same time giving increased assistance to terrorist action in the RSA.

"This Soviet aim explains Swapo's constant, obstinate and unyielding attitude in the negotiating process on SWA.

"It is a clear demonstration of communist ulterior motives in negotiating processes."

In the onslaught against the RSA the USSR had already planned that, after independence, Zimbabwe was to play an important role in supporting the SA ANC. The unfavourable outcome of Zimbabwe's independence for the USSR compelled the Russians to make greater demands on Mozambique.

"Increasing terrorist activities from Mozambique indicate that President Machel is prepared to involve his country more actively in the onslaught against the RSA.

"In order to ensure the continued support of Angola and Mozambique for terrorism against SWA and the RSA the USSR is supplying more and more military aid to these countries.

"In addition to the current Cuban presence East German and Soviet military personnel are becoming increasingly involved in direct support for the armed forces of Angola and Mozambique, as well as in training Swapo and SA ANC terrorists and planning terrorist activities.

"The USSR also supplies armaments, including tanks and fighter aircraft, on a relatively large scale to these countries.

"The air defence systems of Angola and Mozambique have been and are still being improved by the USSR.

"These systems include advanced ground-to-air missiles and the attendant radar equipment."

The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies was to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and to replace it with a Marxist-orientated form of government to further the objectives of the USSR, therefore all possible methods and means were used to obtain this objective.

"This includes instigating social and labour unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of Black leaders and members of the security forces.

"This onslaught is supported by a worldwide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organisations such as trade unions and even certain church organisations and leaders."

Since 1979 the Soviet Union and its allies had continued and intensi-

fied their efforts to isolate the RSA in the political and economic field.

"In the UN efforts have been made to extend the arms boycott against the RSA, while the propaganda onslaught increased in intensity after Zimbabwe became independent."

Subversive activity aimed at causing confrontation with the authorities was being furthered, especially in certain churches, church leaders and organisations in the Republic supported by the World Council of Churches.

"In some cases churches, church organisations and leaders even openly lend moral support to terrorist organisations and also take part in undermining the SA Defence Force by, for instance, supporting those who evade national service."

Base facilities were at present being established in certain neighbouring countries of the Republic from where Soviet-trained terrorists infiltrated sporadically.

"Although there has been a noticeable increase in terrorist incidents in the RSA during the past two years terrorists have not succeeded in obtaining significant support in the country.

"The terrorist onslaught is aimed particularly at obtaining extensive publicity in the local media, an objective that has succeeded to a considerable extent."

In spite of increasing arms supplies by the USSR Swapo's terrorist onslaught in SWA had shown no drastic increase and its activities were still mainly confined to the densely populated areas of Ovamboland.

Gaining Experience in Counter-Insurgency

MILITARY operations against Swapo remained successful and action was still mainly restricted to Owambo, General Malan said in the White Paper.

The SWA operational area remained the focal point of the SA Army's operational commitment.

"Although good progress is being made with the expansion of the SWA Territory Force, the SA Army's participation in operations is still considerable," Gen Malan said.

"Most valuable experience has been gained in internal counter-insurgency operations and across-border pre-emptive strikes, and the lessons learnt are being carefully analysed. New doctrines are

being formulated and applied and at the same time equipment is being adapted and modified."

The activities of the army were still directed towards the maintenance and employment of a balanced and prepared land force in order to discourage or repulse conventional, semi-conventional or insurgency attacks against the Republic and SWA.

During the past two years, more than 3 000 terrorists had been killed. In the same period, three attempts by Swapo to infiltrate deeper south failed as a result of successful area defence measures. During these actions, 44 terrorists were killed and the others fled to Angola.

Security force success, the report says, may be ascribed to the employment of all population groups, knowledge of the area, high morale, determination, fighting spirit and the co-operation of the local population.

"During 1981, members of other population groups from the Republic and SWA comprised almost 40 percent of the total force deployed in SWA.

"Although the Army is not yet extensively involved in anti-terrorist operations in the Republic, the preparation of the counter-insurgency force is continuing and in certain border regions of the Northern Transvaal and Natal, troops are deployed on a full-time basis."

No Doubts of Russian Objectives

IT is evident that the attention of the Soviet Union, its surrogates and the Eastern Bloc countries, is no longer divided and that all efforts will be directed at the Republic, the Defence White Paper says.

"This state of affairs places a great responsibility on every citizen of the Republic and in particular on the defence family.

"Every citizen, irrespective of race or colour, may therefore be expected to contribute unselfishly towards a motivated and prepared defence force which will defend the country and its people with determination and perse-

verance against any military onslaught."

Events, the White Paper says, have dispelled all doubts that may have existed about Soviet imperialist/Marxist objectives throughout the world — and especially in respect of Southern Africa.

"The establishment of Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique as Marxist satellites has completed the link between the Atlantic and Indian oceans and this leaves the Republic of South Africa as the last stronghold of the West in Africa."

Conventional War is Possible

SERIOUS consideration should now be given to the possibility of South Africa becoming involved in a conventional war, the Minister of Defence, General Malan said in the White Paper.

He said in a preface to the Paper it was alarm-

ing that more and more sophisticated armaments from all quarters were pouring into neighbouring countries.

"While the threat against South Africa until fairly recently had manifested itself mainly in the form of insurgency, serious considerat-

ion should now be given to the possibility of conventional warfare," he said.

"The SA Defence Force should therefore be ready, willing and able to defend the RSA with determination and tenacity against any onslaught.

Planning and force development were pre-requisites for the effective employment of a Defence Force and in this respect the threat against South Africa made increasingly severe demands on the Defence family. The deployment of the greatest possible capability, coupled with the most economical allocation of means, was essential.

"Manpower is generally regarded as the most valuable commodity and serves as an important basis for ensuring efficiency and success in military action."

While the West made efforts to defuse conflict situations in Southern Africa, it did not counter Russian intentions more vigorously.

"However there are encouraging signs that the United States is once again prepared to

play an active role as leader of the West," he said.

"The presence of Soviet armaments in the neighbouring countries of the RSA, which include heavy and advanced equipment, increases the possibility of a conventional threat to the RSA and SWA, even in the short or medium term.

"If the Soviet Union wishes to become involved Soviet personnel are all that would be required.

CSO: 4700/1032

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO BUTHELEZI REPORT HIT

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Apr 82 p 4

[Text] **THE** Government's response to the Buthelezi Commission was grossly irresponsible and placed at risk the possibility of continued peaceful co-existence in Natal, Mr Ray Swart, (PFP Be-re-a), said.

Speaking during the Budget debate, he said the Government had blundered by refusing to participate in the commission's deliberations.

"And it did so in the most arrogant way by telling the Chief Minister, Chief Buthelezi, that he should confine his investigations to kwaZulu and should not involve areas and people outside the jurisdiction of the kwaZulu Government."

The whole object of the commission was to seek initiative to secure peaceful co-existence in Natal and kwaZulu which were totally interdependent in every way and would always be so.

Within days of the commission's report being made public, the Government rejected its main recommendations via a terse statement by the Minister

of Finance, Mr Owen Horwood, in his capacity as Natal leader of the National Party, "because they did not conform to Nat ideology and policy".

Yet the Government's policy had already been totally rejected by the overwhelming majority of the people of Natal for a number of reasons, one of them being that it was manifestly unworkable, Mr Swart said.

In the same way the Government had decided to exclude Blacks from the President's Council, the National Party had decided unilaterally on the future of Blacks and was not prepared to consider any other plan or policy.

The Government was heading for confrontation and he urged them to change from "this collision course" before they reached the point of no return.

On the issue of the Minister of Finance, Mr Owen Horwood's Budget, Mr Swart said there appeared to be an alarming lack of co-ordination be-

tween the Public Debt Commission and some of the investors.

"This is an aspect which became particularly acute in the last quarter of 1981 when the Minister was faced with severe problems of liquidity and as it is being freely talked about with growing concern in financial circles, there is a need for the Minister to give clarification on the operation of the fund and the relationship between the commission and its investors."

"Is he satisfied that the commission is receiving the degree of co-operation from its investors which is necessary for it to perform the functions for which it exists, particularly in times of financial stringency?"

In his budget speech the Minister had named two areas of "unexpected" disappointment in regard to the availability of funds in the commission when they were required.

These sources of unexpected shortfalls were the Strategic Oil Fund

and the South African Transport Services.

Mr Swart asked if his information was correct that not only were the estimated investments with the Public Debt Commission not made, but that withdrawals by the Strategic Oil Fund exceeded investments. If so, could this not have been foreseen?

Bearing in mind that the South African Transport Services financed their own capital programme and had their own depreciation fund, what reliance could be placed on the SATS by the Public Debt Commission in regard to future investments and how accurate could any estimate of future investments be from this source?

"The problem seems to come down again to a question of co-ordination and the Minister should give us an explanation as to whether he is satisfied that there is sufficient communication and co-ordination with the fund by the various parties concerned," Mr Swart said.

NRP REFUSES TO JOIN PACT WITH NP

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Apr 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by Jaap Theron]

[Text] THE New Republic Party leader, Mr Vause Raw, yesterday rejected Press speculation that his party had formed a pact with the National Party in the President's Council to accept a single Parliament with three chambers — one each for Whites, Coloureds and Asians.

An afternoon paper said the NRP was believed to have reached broad agreement in the President's Council on a new constitution which could herald a realignment in White politics.

This report came in the wake of continuous rumours at Parliamentary level — all of which have been denied by the NRP leadership — that NRP MPs might cross the floor to the NP.

Mr Raw pointed out last night it was a matter of recorded fact that the NRP had recently expelled its members who entered into

an election pact with the National Party and later supported a non-political administration of Johannesburg through a Management Committee of three PFP members, two NP and one Independent member.

What is ironic he said, is that on the other extreme exactly the same sort of thumb-sucking was used to discredit the National Party in the eyes of potential verkrampies in order to aid the Treurnicht group. "What strange bedfellows," he said.

One could dismiss this report with one impolite word but perhaps it was necessary to deal with this blatant example of cheap journalism. The gay abandon with which propagandists from the Left and Right extremes of politics were speculating on the future of the NRP would be amusing if it did not serve to mislead the public, Mr Raw said.

"The latest sweeping assumption, based on an alleged agreement

on proposals which, to the best of my knowledge, have not even been placed before the President's Council by its political and economic committees and which are certainly unknown to the NRP, demonstrates downright political irresponsibility.

"Based on a direct misstatement on NP/NRP co-operation against the PFP in the Transvaal municipal elections, it shows yet another desperate attempt to undermine the NRP," he said.

It is reportedly said that an awkward problem for the NRP — the exclusion of Blacks from the council's terms of reference — is said to have been largely overcome by the designing of a system which some believe could be readily expanded to include urban Blacks.

The President's Council plan, it is claimed, could be adapted to include a fourth chamber for urban Blacks.

CP-NP CLASH: WHIP ORDERED OUT OF HOUSE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Apr 82 pp 1, 2

[Text]

THE clash between the National Party and Conservative Party yesterday reached a climax during the fourth and final day of debate on the Budget — so much so that interjections flying over the floor from both sides eventually led to the CP's Whip, Mr Jan Hoon, of Kuruman, being ordered by the Speaker to leave the House.

Mr Hoon said the Minister of Agriculture, Mr Piet du Plessis, "lied about the facts that led to the present CP members' walkout of the NP caucus."

He was ordered by the Speaker, Mr Hannes du Toit, to leave the House after he refused to withdraw his allegation.

The question of whether the NP had adopted a "new" policy of power sharing or not formed the basis for yesterday's bitter clashes between the NP and the CP.

Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg, (CP) Lichtenburg, started by saying the CP had to put its case under tremendous provocation in the debate.

"But we did not mind being accused of walking in the dark and of being backstabbers and underminers," he said. "We could understand why the NP felt so unhappy and we were prepared to turn the other cheek as well.

"If the NP was not afraid of us they would have ignored us and let the voters decide for themselves," he said.

He described how he had been driven from the NP caucus and expelled because he had refused to "accept principles which deviated from NP policy."

Differed

"The CP members walked out of the NP caucus because it differed from the NP on one of the most fundamental principles, i.e. whether here should be one Government or various Governments for Whites, Coloureds and Asians.

"The 1977 Constitutional proposals did not give any executive powers to the envisaged Council of Cabinets and neither did it give portfolios to Ministers on that Council.

"But the Prime Minister, who himself said earlier power sharing would lead to self-destruction, was now propagating 'healthy power sharing.'

"The Prime Minister said he was looking for a unique solution, but all the NP, after 70 years of existence, could come up with, was power sharing — a principle which history has proved has always overruled self-dispensation.

Example

"South West Africa is the best example. Its people decided for themselves to accept both power sharing and self-dispensation and today they stand before a one-man-one-vote system.

"I walked out of love for my country and because I believed in self-dispensation.

"Someone had to refuse to walk the road to power sharing — a road which has led to chaos where ever it was tried.

"The CP wanted to give full rights to all nations."

Mr Piet du Plessis, Minister of Agriculture, said politics was a game of realities.

"The CP walked from the caucus in a situation in which they refused to show loyalty towards their leader," he said.

Dr Hartzenberg, interjecting, said: "We wanted to divide the motion of trust in the Prime Minister and other issues."

Only issue

Mr Du Plessis said the only issue before the caucus was a motion of trust in the Prime Minister and the 1977 constitutional proposals.

Mr Jan Hoon, CP Kuruman: "That's a lie".

After admitting he said Mr Du Plessis had told a lie and after refusing to withdraw what he

said, he was ordered to leave the House, which he did.

Mr Du Plessis then accused another CP member, Mr Daan van der Merwe, of Rissik, "of having canvassed votes against the Prime Minister immediately before the said caucus meeting."

The Minister said: "And I'll bring the proof."

Mr van der Merwe, interjecting, said he accepted the challenge.

"The only honourable way out for the CP members, who were elected to Parliament under Mr P W Botha's flag, was to resign now," Mr Du Plessis said.

"The former Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, said the Council of Cabinets would be an Executive Council".

Dr Andries Treurnicht interjecting: "Let's ask Vorster what he said."

Mr Du Plessis said it was noticeable that the term "co-responsibility" which Dr Treurnicht himself had underwritten as the former Transvaal NP leader, was absent in the CP's programme of principles.

"Are you now running away from the word co-responsibility?" he asked Dr Treurnicht.

Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg, interjecting, said they did not like the "interpretation of power sharing" which the NP was attaching to the term.

Mr Du Plessis then stressed that the "cardinal principle" of the 1977 proposals was that of "co-responsibility," a term, he said, by which the NP still stood.

Dr Treurnicht, interjecting, said the CP "did not accept co-responsibility the way the NP understood it."

UNSOLVED MURDERS OF TURNER, MXENGE DEPLORED

Pietermaritzburg REALITY in English Mar 82 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text]

It is now just over four years since Dr. Rick Turner, banned Natal University lecturer and opponent of apartheid, was shot dead in his Durban home. Nobody saw his attacker and no arrest has yet been made. At the time of writing it is over two months since Mr. Griffiths Mxenge left his Durban office as usual one evening, to go home to Umlazi. He never got there. Next day his body was found near the Umlazi cycle track, horribly mutilated.

Mr. Mxenge was a Durban lawyer. Like Dr. Turner he was totally opposed to apartheid. For that opposition he had served a sentence on Robben Island and been both banned and detained. In spite of this he continued to provide the defence in political trials and to be deeply involved in campaigning for change in South Africa.

The Turner murder raised the spectre of South Africa lurching towards the kind of South American situation where politically motivated murders are the order of the day and the murderers are hardly ever brought to trial.

If there has not been an arrest in the Mxenge murder by the time this REALITY appears, or is not one soon, that spectre will be raised again. □

CSO: 4700/1035

RURAL DEPOPULATION THREATENS EASTERN FREE STATE

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 18 Mar 82 pp 18-19

[Article by Hannes Ferguson]

[Text]

Will South Africa lose the eastern Free State by default?

Throughout 160 years of periodic border disputes between South Africa and Lesotho, effective farm occupation has always been the key factor.

Now a situation is developing where the rural depopulation in the so-called "Conquered Territory" is prejudicing South Africa's rights to the region.

The same factors that operated elsewhere to drive farmers to the cities, operated here as well, only more acutely so. The era of cheap food policy coincided with repeated droughts and administrative neglect. Stock thefts are an added curse — despite the efforts of the combined stock theft unit of the South African and Lesotho police forces.

The upshot has been an alarming decrease in the number of white

farmers.

Between 1970 and 1980, the Ficksburg area lost 33 percent of its farmers; Clovelan, 25 percent; Fouriesburg, 47 percent; Hobhouse, as much as 61 percent; Ladybrand, 27 percent; Wepener, 44 percent, and Zastron, 38 percent.

In 1970 their numbers had already declined from what they were in the 50s.

This steady erosion has not left the towns unaffected. Ficksburg was the only town in the region to gain in white population — as much as 22 percent. All the others lost: Fouriesburg, 28 percent; Ladybrand, 14 percent; Wepener, 23 percent; Zastron, 15 percent; Hobhouse, 34 percent.

As the farming population shrunk shops and garages had to close down, doctors and nurses migrated elsewhere, courts and police stations reduced staff, railway stations and schools


were downgraded, municipal staff became redundant.

Hobhouse, which used to have a proud junior high school with almost 300 pupils and sporting the historic Gorraskop as its emblem, saw its school reduced to a small primary one with 31 pupils. Newly built hostels were closed in 1974. Some optimist stuck a note to the girls' hostel door reading, "Closed until better days arrive again."

The ratio of whites to blacks dropped sharply. In 1951 whites made up 40 percent of the population in the towns and 19 percent on the farms. In 1970 the percentages had dropped to 23 and only 11. The rot has since increased.

From the dawn of modern history — which in these parts began around 1800 — farm occupation has been the crucial factor in determining the ownership of the region.

The term "Con-



quered Territory" is actually a misnomer. The districts of Fouriesburg, Ficksburg, Clocolan, Ladybrand, Hobhouse, Wegener and Zastron should rather be called the "repossessed territory."

From before 1800 up to the days of the Voortrekkers, wars of annihilation — the difaqane — swept through the entire region.

Bushmen were relentlessly hunted down and murdered

by the Koranna, a Hottentot tribe. The Koranna then clashed with the first black tribes moving in from the north, mostly of Tswana origin.

These in turn were almost destroyed by the Zulus and their later Matabelle offshoot. Moshweshwe, the leader of a Bakwena group known as the Bamaketeli, moved to the impregnable mountain stronghold of Thaba Bosigo, safe from the

marauding imps of Shaka and Msilikazi. There he started to gather round him the remnants of the dispersed tribes, trying to weld a Sotho nation out of them.

Meanwhile white farmers had trekked in from the south, settling in vast empty spaces. Some of them bartered cattle for land from groups of Bushmen. When the Voortrekkers swelled the ranks of white farmers, the Basotho were still con-

fined to the mountains round Thaba Bosigo.

The Great Trek had brought order and safety, however. Now Moshweshwe could venture out of his fortress.

At that stage the white farmers in the region along the Caledon River and down to the Orange river were caught in the political conflict between the Voortrekkers and the British Government. In 1842, pretending that the Voortrek-

... were still British subjects. The Cape Governor, Sir George Napier, ordered them out of the region in 1843, purporting to act on behalf of the white population, he ceded the area to Moshweshwe, who promptly occupied it with kraals and cattle.

The so-called Warden line of 1849 substantially fol-

lowed the Napier demarcation of 1843. The line ran roughly from Golden Gate to Clarens, Fouriesburg, Marquard, Excelsior, Hobhouse and then along the lower Caledon River.

After British military action against Moshweshwe in which British troops were twice defeated by the Basotho, the British Government withdrew from the whole of the present Free State, which was made an independent republic by the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854.

The republic inherited the Warden line indicating the boundary of Moshweshwe's territory.

Then, encouraged by his success against the British, Moshweshwe turned against the Free State. Provoking a war by systematic stock thefts across the border line and sending growing bands of squatters to occupy lands far inside the Free State border, he was successful again. Hundreds of farmhouses were destroyed and thousands of cattle stolen from farms

deep inside the Free State borders but war led only to a stalemate and a peace treaty confirming the Warden line in 1858.

But thefts and incursions continued. President Brand had to resume military operations in 1865. By now the Free State was better organised and the Basotho were driven back to the Caledon River.

The territory the whites had occupied before 1842 was now repossessed. This was the area between the Warden line and the Caledon River. Riverzigt line, later wrongly termed the Conquered Territory.

Advancing beyond the Caledon River the commandos then occupied more territory — as far as Kornetspruit in the south and the Patlatsane river in the north. This was pure conquered territory, which was subsequently formally ceded by Moshweshwe in the treaty of Thaba Bosigo of 1866.

The Free State then adopted a policy of white settlement in the newly conquered territory east of the Caledon River. It defaulted, however, by not acting in time to establish effective rural occupation. Instead, the Volksraad deliberated at length in Bloemfontein. Land commissions were to visit the area and stake out farms. But there was no strong border force to prevent Basotho incursions by stock thieves and squatters.

The land commis-

sions were faced with large numbers of Basotho who made effective survey of farms almost impossible. The Basotho took advantage of the inertia of the Bloemfontein government by moving into their old kraals, gathering crops and generally turning the occupation scheme into a farce. The peace treaty of Thaba Bosigo was reduced to a scrap of paper.

Sixty years later, in Europe, Professor Karl Haushofer was to teach that in geopolitics, rural occupation was 10 points of the law. This exactly summed up the Free State experience in 1866 and 1867.

Eventually, President Brand decided to march again. New military tactics were employed by the boer commandos and all important fortified positions, even deep in the heart of Basutoland, were taken and destroyed.

In this situation, Moshweshwe was persuaded to request British protection, which was granted. When President Brand refused to withdraw, Britain imposed an ammunition blockade on the Free State.

In the end the Free State had to evacuate the conquered territory between the Caledon River and the Kornetspruit-Patlatsane line. This area included 142 farms with a total area of 183 000 ha. They had been incompletely settled, however. If they had been fully occupied, the Free State would have been able to press its

claims to the conquered territory.

In the subsequent agreement of Aliwal North (1869) the Free State was allowed only to keep the repossessed territory (west of the Caledon River-Riverzigt line) which included the districts of Wepener and Zastron.

The new border, which practically was the old border before 1842, became the internationally recognised boundary between the Free State and Basutoland/Lesotho.

After independence in 1966, Lesotho resurrected its claims on the repossessed territory. Wrongly calling the area a "conquered territory" the Lesotho prime minister, Chief Jonathan, even approached the United Nations.

Prime Minister Dr Verwoerd replied that his government had not the slightest intention of conducting any negotiations in connection with the so-called "conquered territory" of the Free State.

There the matter rested. It could be there because effective white occupation of the repossessed territory was supposed to be beyond any dispute.

Yet as Dr Verwoerd spoke, the basis of the white occupation of the repossessed territory was already being eroded.

Dirk Uys's cheap food policy had started to destroy the profitability of grain farming in what used to be called the "granary" of South Africa — the districts of Clocolan and Ficks-

burg. Ruling maize and wheat prices did not allow smaller farmers to build up any financial reserves to meet the recurrent droughts. They still do not.

A rural development policy was absent. It still is.

Meaningful, planned decentralization of economic activity was considered unnecessary. It still is — no economist takes the Government's current regional planning intentions seriously.

A positive policy to retain public services in the face of rural depopulation had not even been discussed. Recently there has been some discussion but the whole idea was discarded when the Government rejected the Steyn Commission report.

That is why farmers accuse the State of defaulting on its border obligations.

The Free State Agricultural Union

fears that the evacuation of the repossessed territory will continue, lending credence and justification to further Lesotho claims.

Chief Jonathan does not need Hauschofer to tell him that rural occupation is 10 points of the law. The Basotho have known this since the days of the first difaqane.

It's a very, "thin red line" of white farmers now, living among large numbers of Basotho.

And the rising tide of stock thefts cannot be shrugged off. We know what it means. The Agricultural Union says that the South Africa/Lesotho combined stock theft-unit has long ago ceased to be on top of the situation.

Will South African sovereign rights to the repossessed territory in the end become a scrap of paper, just like the peace treaty of Tloha Bosigo . . . by default?

GRA AMENDMENTS ILLUSTRATE 'SELF-DELUSION'

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 19 Mar 82 p 20

[Editorial]

[Text]

SIGNIFICANT change — or token, cosmetic and expedient change? South Africa's syndrome of self-delusion could hardly be better illustrated than by two events yesterday.

In Cape Town, Parliament was busy amending the Group Areas Act: one minor aspect of it which remains a technical barrier to multiracial sport. In Joubert Park, Johannesburg, the Act proper was in full and brutal operation. Its functionaries evicted 12 coloured and Indian families at short notice from homes they were occupying in the "white" area, leaving some with their furniture and possessions on the street — and all of them with no home to call their own.

The amendment to open sports facilities does of course represent progress in its way. It is the result of pressure from sportsmen who were feeling the effects of international sporting isolation, something which has finally got through to the Government as well. So it is prepared to make this minor concession — has done so by permit in fact for the last couple of years — and all MPs support the move except the far-right rebel Nationalists.

But nobody in Government

is even considering, to the best of our knowledge, doing away with the rest of the Group Areas bulldozer — the Act which for 30 years has uprooted entire communities, disrupted lives and made people in ~~their~~ tens of thousands homeless. The dozen families evicted yesterday were in the wrong area because, like thousands of others, they find it impossible to obtain homes in their allotted areas. They were thrown out in a particularly callous way, but many others have already been hit in this particular Johannesburg witch-hunt.

They ask: Does this happen to immigrants from Poland or Zimbabwe? If they are white, foreigners and newcomers to this land get both housing and other assistance from the Government while established citizens get the jackboot treatment. It is a valid enough comparison, and one which admits no honest answers except straight, shameful race prejudice. How on earth can we tell anyone that we are moving away from discrimination — or encourage friends abroad who urge "give them time" — when scenes like these ~~continue~~ to take place?

DEFENSE AMENDMENT BILL, CALL-UP PROPOSALS DEBATED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Apr 82 p 4

[From the "Parliament" page]

[Text]

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. — The Leader of the New Republic Party, Mr Vause Raw, said yesterday false information on the new call-up system envisaged in the Defence Amendment Bill had been leaked to the Press by a traitor to create a negative public impact.

Speaking during the second reading debate on the Bill, Mr Raw said the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, had not helped much to neutralise the negative impact such news of the Bill had had on the public.

He thanked the Minister for having given him and other members of Parliament a briefing on the measure and said he was perturbed at the leak to the Press before the Bill had come to Parliament.

He was sure that the person who leaked it deliberately leaked incorrect information.

Deliberate

"This traitor, and I use the word traitor deliberately, had clear motives. He wanted to give the Bill the worst possible form for the worst possible impact on the public," he said.

"The impact that was

created was that South Africa was in a state of panic and was mobilising its total forces. That is the impact the unexplained information leaked to the Press had," Mr Raw said.

The Minister had then said that the reason for the measure was an escalation of the threat against South Africa and particularly "greater force level demands".

Not true

This was not the true picture, Mr Raw said. The Minister's remarks regarding the availability of manpower, particularly for operational duty, would have been more clearly explained if he had pointed out that the number of volunteers had declined while the applications for exemption had escalated.

The use of the "Marxist/Leninist inspired total onslaught" was also counter-productive

as it was losing its impact on the public, who were regarding it as an exaggerated warning.

It would be more credible to refer to the real threat on the ground by the communist surrogates being used to fight a terrorist war on the country's borders.

The planners responsible for the extent of the measures in the Bill had clearly done their job well in asking for the ideal situation by catering for the maximum and adding a few more for contingencies and for what they perhaps feared they might be refused.

Support

"I do not blame the army for asking Parliament and South Africa for the maximum manpower," he said.

It was up to Parliament, however, to evaluate the situation on the ground and to decide what could be allowed under given circumstances.

For this reason he supported the move to forward the Bill to a select committee after second reading as proposed by the Minister.

The committee could consider and amend it, limiting the scope of the measures proposed, Mr Raw said.

The public had not been convinced of the reasons for the massive mobilisation envisaged in the Defence Amendment Bill, The Progressive Federal Party spokesman on defence, Mr Harry Schwarz, said yesterday.

Speaking in the debate on the motion that the Bill be read a second time, Mr Schwarz moved as an amendment that the order for the second reading be discharged and the subject of the Bill be referred to a select committee for inquiry and report.

The committee should have the power to take evidence and call for papers and to produce an amended Bill, he said.

"To create the impression that everybody up to the age of 60 will have to do military service has done a lot of harm. This has been badly handled and wrongly projected.

The Government has failed in its endeavour to motivate the public to volunteer for the defence force, or to fully appreciate the nature of the threats against the stability of the Republic.

"The reasons for this are quite clear. The public do not accept the existence of a direct Soviet threat. They will accept a threat of terrorism and that Soviet and other communist powers are giving assistance to terrorist movements, but the continuous cry of 'total onslaught' has become meaningless and the result is the normal reaction to the cry of 'wolf' when wolf is cried too often."

Mr Schwarz said the Bill had been misun-

derstood and misinterpreted, particularly in regard to the provision to extend commando service up to the age of 60.

"Both here and abroad there is an image of a massive White mobilisation.

"It helps little to say now it is only planning for contingencies and that the demand will not at this time be as great as stipulated in the Bill, that service in the 'area-restricted' commandos will not be as arduous as normal military service — that only maxima have been laid down. The reality is that the harm has been done."

The Progressive Federal Party believed that while the defence force had to be assisted in its manpower needs and should be effective, the provisions requiring military service up to the age of 60 for all White males, the increase of Citizen Force service from eight to 12 years, in the commandos to 20 years, the increase from 240 to 720 days' service and 1 000 days in the commandos "are not the solution and should not be passed in this form without modification".

One of the reasons why the Bill should be referred to a select committee before second reading rather than after, as proposed by the Government, was to regain public confidence.

"It is desirable to demonstrate that there is not to be a general mobilisation, but planning for contingencies, and also a desire to remedy certain limited problems. Equally important is the need to remove the image at home

and abroad, not only of mobilisation, but of a massive White mobilisation, which would indicate a serious military problem and have other implications."

Mr Schwarz said other reasons for referring the Bill to a select committee before second reading were that:

- A review of the principles concerning the country's manpower position was desirable.

- The question of immigrants could not be dealt with except before second reading.

- The issue of conscientious objection needed consideration and could not be dealt with by the select committee after second reading.

"The country needs confidence, not only in its defence but in the economy and other factors. People are asking why we need this Bill in this form and to this day the campaign has been of such a nature that they have not all been convinced of the reasons for it.

"A select committee before second reading could prepare a new Bill in consultation with interested parties and with considerable benefits to the community at large."

Mr Schwarz said the PFP believed the select committee should examine the manpower needs of the defence force in the context of:

- The manpower needs of the economy.
- The work and family life of the individual.
- The need and desirability of spreading the defence burden more equitably between those who

served in different capacities in the SADF, those who served under the existing system and those who had not served at all, bearing in mind age, health and other factors, and whether greater credit for actual frontline service should be granted.

- The position of White male non-citizens permanently resident in the Republic for more than five years and who, while qualified for citizenship did not

acquire it, bearing in mind the need to attract skilled immigrants and the equities of the situation.

- All the alternatives available, and in particular the feasibility of more civilian employees for certain jobs and of increasing the permanent force.
- More effective use of existing manpower in the SADF to ensure that the time of servicemen was always used to best advantage.

- The actual needs of the defence force at present.

- The psychological effect of the legislation on the individual and the community.

- The possibility of full-time service to compensate for the part-time service.

Mr Schwarz said the PFP was committed to peace, stability and the preservation of law and order. The country needed to be defended against con-

ventional and insurgency attacks.

The long-term solution of South Africa's problems, however, was not military, but political, social and economic.

Giving people a real stake in the country, was the best form of defence.

South Africa needed a larger permanent force in which members of all race groups could serve on a volunteer basis.

'Hope for Reform Diminished'

THE massive mobilisation of Whites in South Africa envisaged by the Defence Amendment Bill diminished any hope for reform, Mr Ray Swart (PFP Berea) said.

He said during the second reading debate on the Bill, the only justification for young South Africans to be involved in military service was that the Defence Force acted as a shield behind which politicians made the necessary socio-economic and political changes.

"Those who are involved in military service are there not to defend the policies of any political party or apartheid but to defend South Africa and to provide a shield behind which there can be peaceful change and reform in order to establish a just society for by peaceful means," he said.

"But this Bill in its present form holds out diminishing hope of that reform taking place. That is my concern," he said.

"The main and overriding principle of this Bill is for a massive mobilisation of Whites in South Africa — a mobilisation with all its consequences for our econ-

omy, with all its consequences for the private lives of those people and their families from the time they leave school until they reach the age of 60.

"And above all, a mobilisation with all the consequences for race relations in South Africa," Mr Swart said.

Such mobilisation had not been necessary in World War II when the mightiest war machine the world had known sought to subjugate and dominate all before it.

"Now we are being told there is a crisis of even greater proportions than of those times, necessitating a mobilisation of manpower the likes of which this nation has never before experienced."

South Africa was not involved in a hot war alongside powerful allies against great armies, navies and airforces but in a local struggle against those who sought to subvert the existing order.

Although they were aided and abetted and sometimes manipulated by influences from outside they were no match for the existing defence capabilities of South Africa on their own, Mr Swart said.

"The real threat from these forces lies in their possible ability to rally internal support in South Africa by playing on the grievances of their own people and exploiting the injustices and inequalities which exist in our own society to subvert internal security and bring about change by violent means."

An effective army and a commitment by all South Africa's people was required to rally against violence and subversion but the defence chiefs had said that the solution to problems was only 20 percent military and 80 percent socio-economic and political.

In these circumstances it was the Progressive Federal Party's view that the Defence Force had to be a shield, behind which the necessary changes could be made internally.

The principle behind the Bill was a greatly extended mobilisation of Whites to the exclusion of the masses of the population who were the targets for the forces of insurrection.

COUNTRY'S MADEIRANS PUBLICIZE IDENTITY

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 26 Mar 82 p 13

[Article by Aida Parker]

[Text]

AFTER 200 years as probably South Africa's least-known community, South Africa's 350 000 Madeirans are on an aggressive "please get to know me" campaign. Now the island's leading banker has arrived to give them a helping hand in this project.

He is Dr Henrique Abrantes, president of the Caixa Economica do Funchal, Madeira's flourishing (and only) domestically controlled bank.

Dr Abrantes says that since Lisbon's "carnation" revolution of 1975, Madeirans both at home and abroad had sought to establish their own separate identity.

"In the past people have believed that because we all speak Portuguese, there is no difference between the people of metropolitan Portugal and Madeira. In fact, all we have in common is the language and the same cultural traditions.

"Just as the man

from Scotland wants to be known as a Scot, so we from Madeira want to be identified as Madeirans.

"This search for a separate identity is not confined to South Africa. There are now 1 200 000 persons of Madeiran stock living overseas. South Africa has the biggest single community, but there are also important communities in Venezuela, Brazil, Canada and even Australia.

"What my bank, and our people, wish to do is promote cultural exchanges and integration with the peoples of the countries in which our countrymen now live. Above all, we want to give the Madeirans abroad a new image.

"Although the first Madeirans arrived in South Africa in the 18th century, the bulk arrived from the 1930s onwards. Most came penniless and without education. Ours are

hardworking people. Slowly but surely they improved their destiny.

"Today Madeirans are to be found in every major field of endeavour in the country. Many have made it to the top — yet still many South Africans think of them as strictly cafe owners and market gardeners.

"That is what we want to correct. Many of our people here have been naturalised. They realise that in South Africa they have been given business and educational opportunities."

Mr Gil Nunes, Madeiran community leader in Johannesburg, took up the story: "We are determined to make South Africa proud of us. Because of this debt we owe South Africa, we have identified very strongly with the Southern Cross Fund. Our people have raised very close to R100 000 for this fund."

ROLE OF URBAN FOUNDATION IN CONTEMPORARY NATION DESCRIBED

Pietermaritzburg REALITY in English Mar 82 pp 11-14

[Article by Peter Wilkinson: "Straddling Realities"]

[Text]

Until perhaps as recently as a year ago, it would have been tempting to construct a 'radical' critique of the Urban Foundation (UF) around the apparent compatibility of the organization's programme with the objectives of the 'Total Strategy' formulated by the government of P. W. Botha. Indeed, elements of such an analysis remain central to the argument that will be advanced here. But since the events of the past year have exposed the deep-seated antipathy of an important section of the government's electoral base towards any attempt at 'meaningful reform', the inadequacy of a critique which simply continues to assert the UF's complicity in 'Total Strategy' must be confronted.

After the recent much-heralded 'report back' conference between Botha and leading businessmen fizzled out inconclusively in Cape Town, it would be merely naive to attempt to maintain the notion of an *unproblematic* partnership of 'state' and 'capital' in a joint project aimed at co-opting the black 'middle classes' under the guise of implementing an essentially hollow reform strategy. What I shall be trying to do in this article, therefore, is to shift the analysis of the UF's role in contemporary South Africa beyond the terms of this now somewhat unproductive polemic. I propose to approach the problem in two stages. In the first place, I want to locate the UF within the framework of the present (November 1981) conjuncture in South Africa by tracing, briefly and somewhat schematically, certain developments bearing on the role of the Foundation during the nearly five years that have elapsed since it was initially set up in December 1976. Secondly, I shall argue that these developments have left the UF in a position in which it is poised between the reality in which it first took shape and the reality of the present, and I shall explore some of the dimensions of the critical strategic choice with which I believe it is now faced.

Throughout, in order to keep the length of this article within acceptable limits and to avoid unnecessary references to matters that have received extensive coverage in the press, I will assume a degree of broad familiarity on the part of readers with the more general aims and activities of the UF.¹

To even the most casual observer, it must be clear that the South African 'situation' has changed dramatically since 1976. In order to pick out those developments which I consider to have had particular significance in relation to the role of the UF, I shall delineate a necessarily rather arbitrary-seeming division of this period into three phases. It is, of course, obvious that such periodizations - particularly of such recent history - must be directly derived from certain analytical premises. Although these will not be explicitly discussed here, I hope that they will become evident in the course of the analysis itself.

PHASE 1: JUNE 1976 - SEPTEMBER 1978

During the earlier part of this phase, much of the state's energy and attention was committed to re-establishing control in the townships, often with extensive and unrestrained use of force. It is understandable, then, that the initiative towards the social reforms that were obviously necessary if some degree of legitimacy for the South African system was to be maintained in the black communities, fell, in the first instance, to certain of the more progressively inclined representatives of commerce and industry. Specifically, we see that as early as August 1976, Harry Oppenheimer and Anton Rupert met in London to discuss the idea of a "businessmen's conference on the quality of life in urban communities."

The immediate result of the conference - which was held three months later in November - was a decision by the businessmen present to form a Foundation, financed and managed by the 'private sector', to "promote improvement of the quality of life" in the black townships "on a non-racial, non-political basis".² The Foundation was formally established as an "Incorporated Association not for Gain" in February 1977, and within three months had begun "a relentless and unremitting pursuit" of its primary objective of obtaining a secure form of tenure for Africans in urban areas - which was eventually to bear fruit in the passage of the 99-year leasehold legislation as an amendment to the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act in June 1978. A year earlier, in June 1977, the UF had initiated "intensive negotiations" with "organized commerce and industry" to secure agreement on a code of employment practice - the joint UF-SACCOLA code published in December 1977 - which predated by some two months the state's appointment of the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions to enquire into "labour legislation and other related matters" and "legislation affecting the utilization of manpower", respectively.³

Yet, within the state apparatus during this early period, repression of the revolt in the townships was not the sole matter of concern. In March 1977, P. W. Botha (then Minister of Defence and possibly still smarting from the experience of the aborted invasion of Angola) tabled a White Paper calling for a "total national strategy . . . applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of specific policies".⁴ Initially, endorsement of this notion of 'Total Strategy' appears to have remained confined to a certain faction within the government and to that branch of the state apparatus most directly involved in its formulation, i.e. the military.

Just eighteen months later, however, with the Vorster regime collapsing massively and ignominiously in the face of the 'Information scandal', the proponents of 'Total Strategy' were suddenly — if by an extremely narrow margin — elevated to the commanding heights of state power by Botha's accession to the premiership. It is this event which I take to have signalled the start of the second phase.

PHASE 2: SEPTEMBER 1978 — JANUARY 1981

Within weeks of Botha's assumption of office, the most immediate threat to his newly acquired power was summarily removed with Connie Mulder's resignation from the Cabinet as a result of further disclosures in the Information scandal. Botha and his allies — including Mulder's replacement as Minister of Plural Relations/Bantu Affairs, Piet Koornhof — moved rapidly to consolidate their position at the head of what was shortly being hailed as a truly *verligte* Nationalism. In a display of mutual goodwill unknown since the Nationalists had taken up the reins of government in 1948, overtures were made by the government to the business community to draw it into the implementation of 'Total Strategy' — always an integral part of the overall concept⁵ — and appeared to be meeting with considerable success.

The growing rapprochement between business interests and the government attained what in retrospect seems to have been its high point at the Prime Minister's Carlton conference of November 1979. It is possible that the conference was intended to smooth the way for an at least tacit 'division of labour' in the task of maintaining political, social and economic stability in South Africa which would be accepted by both sides.⁶ Broadly speaking, this would have involved the government in a restructuring of its political policies to facilitate a more 'rational' economic exploitation of the sub-continent's human and natural resources, while the private sector would have been responsible for tackling problems supposedly susceptible to amelioration by the expansion of the 'free enterprise' system, such as rural underdevelopment, unemployment, an inadequately skilled labour force and the relative absence of a black entrepreneurial class.

In this atmosphere, it would not have been unreasonable to anticipate that the role already taken on by the UF in dealing with the unfortunate effects of 'old-style' apartheid on the 'quality of life' in the townships could take on a new and expanded effectivity. Certainly, the notion of 'quality of life' encompassed many of the problems which had been identified as open to private sector involvement. In terms of its charter, moreover, the UF had been committed to intervention in a "complementary role to the public sector", which meant that there would "at all times be full consultation with central, provincial, and local Government in the planning and execution of projects".⁷ It may well have seemed that the Botha government was attempting to implement sufficient real, if still partial reforms of its inherited apartheid policy to give the Foundation's efforts to contribute to "the creation of a long-term, socio-political climate in which free enterprise itself will survive"⁸ a good chance of succeeding.

In terms of what were apparently considered to be the essential preconditions for such survival — articulated by Anton Rupert as "a free market economy, a stable middle class with the necessary security of tenure, personal security and a feeling of hope for a betterment (sic) in the hearts of all our people"⁹ — the programme of action that had been adopted by the UF made substantial sense. The 99-year leasehold scheme it had so assiduously championed would provide the "necessary security of tenure" for the development of a "stable black middle class", at least until full freehold tenure could be won for it. And, for those unable to aspire to the leasehold legislation's 'rights of occupancy' in such developing elite suburbs as Selection Park and Beverley Hills (in Soweto), pilot 'self help' low-cost housing projects at Khutsong (near Carletonville) and Inanda (near Durban) would provide at least the possibility of "hope for a betterment" in the material conditions of their daily existence. In the meantime, the further possibilities of a "free", or at least "freer market economy" and of "personal security" for at least some of the African inhabitants of the urban areas were under review by the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions.

Gradually, however, throughout 1980, the euphoria generated in some circles by the Carlton conference began to wane as it became increasingly clear that the 'reformist' faction within the National Party was not as tightly in control of either the party or the government as had been believed. Initiatives introduced by one state department were sometimes fiercely resisted by another — as, for instance, in the refusal of the Department of Community Development to consider the merits of 'self-help' site and service schemes proposed by the Department of Co-operation and Development. Ministers found that their ability to direct the implementation of Cabinet policy within their own departments was more constrained than they had imagined — leading in Koornhof's case to the discovery of the much-parodied 'tortoise' syndrome within

the civil service. And incursions by the far right into the NP's traditional electoral base in a series of by-elections held during the year exacerbated growing tensions within the party. Finally, late in January 1981, in an attempt to re-unite a political constituency rapidly fracturing, under the pressures of both external events (escalation of the 'border' war, the consolidation of a nominally socialist government in Zimbabwe) and internal economic problems (the increasingly difficult situation of the white working class), along a bewildering variety of stress lines not previously visible, Botha dissolved Parliament and called a general election for April.

Before we proceed to examine the third and last phase I have identified here, I want briefly to point to two further tendencies which characterized the latter part of the second phase and which have continued into the third and possibly up to the present. The first of these was the dawning realisation by the leaders of the private sector's reform initiative that the Botha government might yet prove to be either unable or unwilling to actually deliver its expected package of policy reforms. This was signalled as early as June 1979 by the failure of the Riekert Commission's report (and even more so the subsequent White Paper) to confront what the *Financial Mail* identified as "the central weakness of the labour bureaux — their part in enforcing the pass laws".¹⁰ The growing disenchantment of progressive business leaders with the Botha regime was further reflected in the declining prominence accorded by the opposition press to the notion of 'Total Strategy' as 1980 wore on. In effect, it appears that the 'report-back' conference held in Cape Town in November 1981 has probably delivered the coup de grâce to whatever credibility the concept might still have retained.

The second tendency during this period to which I wish to draw attention was the emergence, and gradual but still fragile consolidation, of a number of increasingly effective community-based movements committed to the ideal of establishing participatory democracy at the grass roots level of local government. In the major metropolitan centres, organizations able to mobilize substantial popular support in the black townships around specific issues like inadequate housing and facilities, or rent increases, arose to challenge the idea that the question of the 'quality of life' in the townships could genuinely be posed on a 'non-racial, non-political basis'. In particular, at the level of their political practices, such organisations consistently refused to operate through the medium of the blatantly unrepresentative institutions set up by the state in its efforts to secure the co-operation of 'community leaders'. Further, at the level of their understanding of the fundamental nature of the 'quality of life' problem, these organizations began to question the validity of any 'solution' which in their perception remained merely ameliorative, dealing with the symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes of the problem.¹¹

I will argue that the appearance of this social force in the townships now presents to the UF both a more complex arena in which to operate, and the possibility of making its intervention more effective in terms of its own criterion of "an over-riding emphasis on projects based on self-help and self-determination".¹²

If, in the assertion of the Foundation's executive director that "community involvement in every aspect of the Foundation is critical to its success",¹³ 'community involvement' is meant in any but the most cynical of terms, it seems unlikely that a choice between ignoring such movements and working with them as independent and authentically representative organs of popular 'self-determination' can be avoided. In order to explore this hypothesis more fully, however, I wish to bring the analysis in which we have been engaged forward to the present by considering the last phase in the periodization that I have proposed.

PHASE 3: JANUARY 1981 – PRESENT

The run up to the election in April was marked by the reversion of most of the so-called 'reformists' in the National Party to the unbridled *swart gevaar* tactics so successfully employed by the party during the 1950s and 1960s. Even such masters of the ambiguous statement of 'reformist' intention as Piet Koornhof adopted the traditional postures as panic over the extent of defections of the faithful to the far right mounted. In the event, the results of the election provided unequivocal evidence of a substantial, if still relatively contained disaffection within the white working class and elements of the middle classes with the direction taken by the party under Botha's leadership.¹⁴

The effect of the election results has been to deepen a trend which had already become apparent as 'Total Strategy' began to dissolve under the pressure of events during 1980: a propensity by the government to sequester the more controversial issues confronting it within the terms of reference of a Commission of Enquiry whose findings, when they were eventually released, could be either simply ignored or referred to yet another Commission or Committee for further consideration. In the face of this now seemingly chronic inability of the government to move positively on the issue of 'meaningful reform', the alienation of that section of the business community committed to such reform has continued.

Clear signs of impatience with the government's failure to advance beyond this impasse and an awareness of its consequences in relation to the credibility of private sector initiatives have been expressed in some of the more recent documents published by the UF. In the Foundation's *Annual Review* for 1980/81, for instance, produced in February 1981, the executive director wrote:

Our future relationships with this important constituency (i.e. "Black communities") are unfortu-

nately not dependent only upon our own efforts. Our third constituency (i.e. the "public sector") controls much of the access that we have to opportunities that demonstrate the private sector's willingness to contribute to structural change in South Africa.¹⁵

But, in addition to these problems, the UF has evidently also begun to encounter difficulties with the remaining member of its supposed "three constituencies"¹⁶ Again in the *Annual Review* for 1981, Judge Steyn — after noting that the initial impetus of fund-raising by the Foundation had not been maintained during the previous year — stated that it was his belief that "save for a small group of leaders of commerce and industry, much of the business community is unaware of or indifferent to the real significance which urgent Black aspirations have assumed in Africa."¹⁷

One might speculate that the origins of the resistance experienced by the UF in this quarter in its efforts to contribute to "structural change in South Africa" is not unconnected with the emergence of the so-called 'New Right' in Britain and the United States. If as a businessman, you believe merely that "the business of business is business" or, more philosophically, subscribe to the doctrine that Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' really does promote the 'public interest' most effectively,¹⁸ then you can have little in the way of common cause with an organization which "pre-eminently . . . reflects the concern and sensitivity of the business community in respect of unacceptable aspects of our society and its structures".¹⁹ (Other, of course, than on the purely charitable basis which the UF emphatically rejects.²⁰

In any event, when this possibility is coupled with an explicit recognition by the UF of the deep divisions existing within black communities — which, however, is followed immediately by what seems to be an indication of the Foundation's intention to plump for "the support of much of the acknowledged Black leadership"²¹ — it is evident that it is no longer actually attempting to mediate between "three constituencies". The Foundation is, in fact, now enmeshed in the extraordinarily complex set of deep-rooted antagonisms and conflicts which traverse the entire social fabric of South Africa. Even if at one time the notion of the 'public sector', the 'private sector' and the 'Black communities' as relatively unified or homogeneous entities (or 'constituencies') approximated to reality, it clearly no longer does so.

Furthermore I want to put forward the proposition that the UF itself is not a privileged institution and that like the state or any other element of the social structure in a society like South Africa, it remains subject to internal clashes of the values and practices generated within it by the 'external' structure. In particular, there exists in the Foundation's programme of action and its mode of

operation a real tension between the idea of 'free enterprise' and the notion of 'social responsibility', which in turn is cross-cut by the tension between an emphasis on community 'self-determination' — surely only realisable in a fully democratic society — and a pragmatic commitment to working through the existing channels of power. It is these tensions, I believe, which developments over the last five years have brought to the surface and which the Foundation must now confront.

The most significant of the factors defining the situation within which the UF must attempt to resolve these conflicts is, I would argue, the entry into the social and political arena of the new, democratically organized community movements. In a very immediate and concrete way, these organizations have defined a field of action which to an important degree overlaps, even if it does not exhaust, the areas of intervention mapped out by the Foundation. At the same time, the objectives and methods developed by the Foundation under what I have suggested were the quite different circumstances of an earlier period have apparently begun to encounter the increasingly difficult and fragmented conditions that now prevail. The notion of "three constituencies" can no longer be sustained when the divisions within those 'constituencies' have deepened and widened to the extent that they quite obviously have over the last two years.

So, with its conventional wisdom rendered untenable by the course of events, and with its accepted methods rapidly disintegrating in the cauldron of the present, it seems that the UF is now faced with a critical strategic choice. Either — despite what are clearly major differences in both long-term goals, and the more immediate questions of tactics and 'style' — it can attempt to forge links with the developing community movements which remain unequivocally committed to those structural changes without which the 'quality of life' in the townships of South Africa cannot, in any *fundamental* way, be improved. Or it can continue to cling to the approach that has served it with a certain, limited efficacy in the past — and face the prospect of being overtaken by history. Whichever choice it makes, South Africa, driven by profound contradictions and struggles which we can still only dimly comprehend, lurches on into the future. Straddling the reality of its past and the reality of its present, the Urban Foundation stands poised at the moment of its crisis. We await, with interest, an indication of the direction it will take□

REFERENCES:

1. Readers less familiar with this background material are referred to two documents on which I have drawn heavily in preparing the article: *Special Report: The Urban Foundation — two years on*, supplement to the *Financial Mail*, 16th February 1979; and *Urban Development 1981: a special supplement on the Urban Foundation*, published in *The Sowetan*, 5 June 1981.

Other source materials have included the reports and information bulletins published regularly by the Foundation, as well as various pamphlets, brochures and broadsheets issued by it.

2. The Urban Foundation, 'Your investment in the future of South Africa' pamphlet n.d., p. 3.
3. Quotes in this passage are taken from The Urban Foundation, **First Progress Report, 1 March 1977 to 31 October - 1978**, pp. 4 - 5.
4. Cited in **Survey of race relations in South Africa, 1977** S.A. Institute of Race Relations, 1978, p. 87.
5. Cf. G. Moss, ' "Total Strategy" ', **Work in Progress** 11, February 1980.
6. Cf. **Sunday Express** editorial of 25 November 1979 listing "what each side must do to make the Prime Minister's ('constellation of states') plan succeed"; cited in M.G. Paul, 'Constellation or black hole?', **Work in Progress** 19, August 1981, p. 35.
7. The Urban Foundation, 'Your investment in the future of South Africa', p. 7.
8. Judge J.H. Steyn, executive director of the UF, quoted in 'The Urban Foundation - an investment in the future of South Africa', UF, brochure, n.d., p. 5.
9. Quoted *ibid.*, p. 4.
10. 'Back to square one', **Financial Mail**, 29 June 1979, p. 1146. See also the analysis offered in the 'Focus on Riekert' edition of the **South African Labour Bulletin** 5 (4), November, 1979.
11. On this, see virtually any issue of **Grassroots**, the Cape Town - based "community newsletter", and the report on the Durban Housing Action Committee's workshop on 'home-ownership' schemes in **SASPU National** 2 (6), August 1981, pp. 12-13.
12. 'The Urban Foundation - an investment in the future of South Africa', p. 1.
13. Judge J. H. Steyn; quoted in: **Special Report : The Urban Foundation - two years on**, p. 19.
14. Cf. C. Charney, 'Towards stasis or rupture? An analysis of the 1981 South African general election', paper presented to the African Studies seminar, University of the Witwatersrand, 24th August 1981.
15. 'Review by the Executive Director', **The Urban Foundation: Annual Review 1980/81**, February 1981, p. 5. Cf. text of the press statement released by the UF on 21 May 1981; included in a brochure issued by the UF, n.d., n.p.
16. Cf. 'On a tightrope connected to three constituencies', **Special Report: The Urban Foundation - two years on**, pp. 11-19.
17. 'Review by the Executive Director', *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.
18. A statement by Stephen Mulholland (now editor of the **Financial Mail**) which explicitly embraces both aspects of this view is included in **Special Report: The Urban Foundation - two years on**, p. 6; see also p. 3.
19. **The Urban Foundation: Annual Review 1980/81**, pp. 2-3.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 2: "It must be emphasized that the Urban Foundation is not a charitable institution that makes hand-outs to people . . . It is the arm of free enterprise working as an agent towards the development of a society in which acceptable human values can be maintained."

RESURGENCE OF ANC MOVEMENT TRACED

Pietermaritzburg REALITY in English Mar 82 pp 7-9

[Article by Tom Lodge: "The A.N.C. Resurgence 1976-1981"]

[Text]

In the five years which have elapsed since the Soweto uprising the African National Congress has re-emerged as the political group with probably the greatest degree of popular support within the black townships.¹ Already in the process of re-establishing a presence inside South Africa before June 1976, its military wing, Umkonto we Sizwe, was able to capitalise on the political exhilaration which was generated by the disturbances themselves in mounting an at times spectacular campaign of sabotage and guerilla warfare. The uprising was succeeded by the exodus of thousands of young men and women to Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana and many of these were to provide Umkonto with a new army of highly motivated and well-educated (in contrast to the recruits in the early 1960s) saboteurs. By mid 1978 South African security police chiefs estimated that approximately 4000 refugees were undergoing insurgent training in Angola, Libya and Tanzania, most of these under ANC auspices.² At the same time the police reckoned that 2 500 people had already been brought to court as a result of their participation in the sabotage campaign.³ Together with the scale and frequency of Umkonto attacks this makes it the most sustained violent rebellion in South African history and all the indications are that it will develop into a full-scale revolutionary war. A chronology of guerilla activity made in 1981 records 112 attacks and explosions between October 1976 and May 1981.⁴ In March 1978 it was reported that one explosion a week had taken place since the previous November.⁵

In contrast to the first Umkonto campaign, the targets, particularly in the 1980 - 1981 phase, have often been ones of considerable strategic or economic importance. They have included the synthetic oil refinery at Sasolburg (June 1980), power stations in the Eastern Transvaal (July 1981), and the Voortrekkerhoogte military

base (August 1981). Police stations have been a favourite target, especially those in or near townships; Germiston, Daveyton, New Brighton, Chatsworth, Moroka, Soekmekaar and Booysens police stations were all subjected to grenade, rocket or bomb attacks between 1977 and 1980. As well as this, African security policemen have been assassinated on several occasions. From the events which have been reported in the press or which have emerged from trial evidence a historical pattern is beginning to become evident. 1977 to 1979 seem to have been years in which Umkonto was principally concerned with establishing its lines of communication and infiltration (which have been principally from Mozambique, and, until a clamp-down by local authority in mid 1978, Swaziland), setting up arms caches, as well as forming a cellular organisational structure in the main townships.⁶ In consequence the most dramatic incidents were in the form of gun battles in the North-Eastern border regions between guerillas and the police. In most cases these resulted from police patrols intercepting guerilla units returning from the training camps but in some instances the guerillas themselves mounted attacks on police patrols in what was believed to be an attempt to divert attention from the flow of insurgents to the main urban centres on the Rand.⁷ Umkonto groups also tried to establish rudimentary bases and support groups in the countryside of the North-Eastern Transvaal: the attack on Soekmekaar police station was designed to enhance the ANC's popularity in an area recently affected by enforced resettlement.⁸ Meanwhile Molotov cocktails thrown at policemen's houses and railway bombings predominated in the reports of sabotage attempts.

From 1980, it appears, the aim seems to have been to select targets, the destruction of which would create the maximum popular resonance, first on the Rand, and then, possibly as a result of police pressure in Soweto, in Durban. The avowed purpose of the attacks has been demonstrative; one captured guerilla actually used the phrase 'armed propaganda'.⁹ On the whole their intention seems to have been to inspire confidence amongst the dominated population rather than terror within the white community. Much of the violence has been directed at targets with a special significance for Africans; incidents which have involved the deaths of white civilians, the 1977 Goch street warehouse shootings or the Silverton Bank siege for example, do not appear to have been preconceived and have rather been the consequence of only superficially trained men being forced on to the defensive. In contrast with the earlier Umkonto campaign much more emphasis has been placed on co-ordinating sabotage efforts with local mass struggles; as well as the Soekmekaar attack in 1980, Soweto bombings were orchestrated with a popular campaign against rent increases. With the exception of the assassination of informers and other people regarded as collaborators (African security policemen, for example), the campaign's strategy has been guided by the principle that civilian casualties

should be avoided.¹⁰ In August 1981, however, Oliver Tambo announced that the ANC would in future attack 'officials of Apartheid' (which in fact Umkonto insurgents had never had any inhibitions in doing) and that moreover there might arise 'combat situations' in which civilians could be killed.¹¹ A few days before Tambo's statement appeared in the foreign press (it was not reported inside South Africa) a bomb exploded in the main shopping centre of Port Elizabeth; unlike earlier inner-city explosions this one took place during working hours. It was seen at the time as a reprisal for the then recent murder in Salisbury of the ANC representative in Zimbabwe, Joe Gqabi. Gqabi, who had played an important role in the first Umkonto campaign, was one of the Robben Island prison veterans who had been chiefly responsible for reactivating an ANC leadership in Soweto in late 1975 and establishing what ANC links existed with the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC). He had gone into exile after his acquittal in one of the first major trials arising from the sabotage campaign.

Apart from the effects of Umkonto's sabotage campaign, the ANC's influence on popular political perceptions¹² has been consolidated since 1976 by the re-emergence of open political discussion within the African community. Here the commercial press has played an important role: in 1980, for example, the Soweto daily newspaper, *The Post*, ran a 'Release Mandela' petition form in its columns for several months as well as helping to popularise the Freedom Charter. The Charter was taken up and adopted by several organisations including a new student association, formed in 1979, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). COSAS stands in conscious opposition to organisations which claim to be inspired by the precepts of Black Consciousness.

Meanwhile the ANC's external organisation has been untroubled by any serious dissension. This is all the more remarkable bearing in mind the huge infusion of new recruits, many of them from a background in which the ANC's leadership had little legitimacy. The organisation was well placed to cope with this sudden expansion; it had the equipment, the financial resources, and the training facilities (located mainly in Angola) required to transform these recruits into a guerilla force. In contrast with the 1960s, training periods have been short, militarily and politically extremely effective, and of course the possibilities of going into action have been for trained insurgents infinitely greater; all this has contributed to discipline and morale in the camps. In consequence ideological dissent within the leadership does not seem to have had much effect on rank and file. In particular there have been two dissident tendencies, both of which have involved dissatisfaction with the role of the South African Communist Party within the external movement. The first involved Okhela, the faction started in Paris in 1973 as a 'white consciousness' group with the apparent encouragement of

Tambo who hoped it might counter-balance the influence of communists within the ANC. With the failure of Breytenbach's expedition Okhela had lost favour with the ANC establishment. The vetoing of an Okhela scheme to circulate Afrikaans 'samizdat' literature in South Africa confirmed a growing conviction among the remaining Okhela adherents that the ANC was racist in its attitude towards Afrikaners. Already increasingly antipathetic to the SACP, between 1976 and 1978 the Okhela group made overtures to the ANC African Nationalists then based in Algiers. In 1979 Okhela collapsed in the wake of its most influential spokesman's flight to South Africa and his subsequent admission of being a police informer.¹³ The African Nationalists were similarly discredited with Tennyson Makiwane's return to the Transkei and his enlistment in the Transkeian foreign service. In 1980 Makiwane was assassinated. Though the Transkeians blamed the ANC it may have been significant that he had been involved in a coup d'état conspiracy by former ANC and PAC men to overthrow the Matanzima administration.¹⁴

The second group of dissenters developed from the new generation of South African marxist academics which had emerged at English universities in the early 1970's. Together with recent exiles who had been involved with the regeneration of African trade unions in South Africa they were gradually to become increasingly sceptical of the capacity of the SACP for creating a proletarian democracy, and increasingly critical of the petty-bourgeois orientation of the ANC's exile leadership. Their criticisms were first of all centred on the work of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in which some of them were involved; in particular they disagreed with what they felt to be the dominant perception of SACTU's function — to serve as a 'sign-post', directing workers to Umkonto we Sizwe.¹⁵ With the expulsion of the principal figures in this group, Martin Legassick, Rob Petersen, David Hemson and Paula Ensor, the ANC effectively cut itself off from a potentially creative source of intellectual stimulation. The rebels subsequently constituted themselves as a 'workers' tendency' within the ANC but because of their isolation from rank and file ANC membership their aim of helping to transform the nationalist movement into a truly working class organisation appears forlornly romantic.

Despite the fresh emphasis on insurgent activity the ANC's leadership has been careful not to neglect diplomacy. Here it has displayed considerable self-confidence and finesse. This is a field in which the Tambo leadership was always rather adept and in the post-Soweto years it has had to contend with several significant challenges. The first of these was posed by the emergence of a third exile force as a result of the arrival in European and African capitals of leaders from the South African Students' Organisation, Black People's Convention and SSRG. The less ideologically

doctrinaire of these found little difficulty in joining the ANC but for those who subscribed fully to the tenets of Black Consciousness there were obvious objections to this. At the same time the disarray among the Pan-Africanists made them equally unacceptable. Furthermore there were substantial temptations to maintain a distance from the two exile organisations: European social democrats were keen to patronise a 'third force' free of soviet connections and more vital than the Pan-Africanist-Congress (PAC). From the mid 1970s under the direction of Lars-Gunner Eriksson, the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF) began channelling large sums of money to the Black-Consciousness-movement representatives both within and outside the country. According to a South African security policeman who infiltrated the IUEF, in 1978 through skillful lobbying of the various left-wing and social democrat groupings which financed the IUEF, the ANC was able to put a stop to this. Moreover the ANC succeeded in extracting an agreement from IUEF representatives that in future no South African projects would be funded without their approval.¹⁶ By late 1980 many of the principal figures in the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (which had been formally established the year before in London) were joining the ANC. These included Barney Pitso, one of the founders of SASO in 1969.¹⁷

The episode was an indication of an increasingly determined effort by the ANC to gain for itself 'sole legitimate representative' status in the view of potential allies. Here it has been aided by the faction fighting in the PAC which prevented the latter from fully exploiting the victory of its erstwhile ally — Mugabe's ZANU — in the Zimbabwe elections. The ANC's guerilla units, incidentally, were reported to be fighting alongside Nkomo's ZAPU-oriented forces until the ceasefire. The appointment as the ANC's representative of Joe Gqabi, who like many of the ZANU military leaders was Chinese-trained, and who in addition had not been involved in any previous exile political activity, was tactful and astute.

Meanwhile, in London, Oliver Tambo arranged and attended his daughter's wedding in St. Paul's Cathedral and maintained (against strong internal pressure from the left wing of his organisation) discreet links with Gatsha Buthelezi. Even when finally compelled to attack the homeland leader for his behaviour during a Kwa Mashu school boycott in 1980, Tambo was nevertheless careful not to outrightly condemn the Inkatha movement. With the revival in South Africa of legal mass organisations with previous Congress associations the stodgily petit-bourgeois respectability of the Tambo leadership has an important function in ensuring that internal support for the ANC remains as widely-based as possible. The current enthusiasm for the Freedom Charter and the apparent downgrading of the more radical 'strategy and tactics' adopted at Morogoro¹⁸ may also be indicative of a realistic perception of the

danger of alienating the steadily growing Black middle class. □

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5. **Rand Daily Mail**, 10 March 1978.
6. South African Institute of Race Relations, **Annual Survey of Race Relations, 198**, SAIRR, Johannesburg, 1981, p. 61.
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10. In November 1980 the ANC became a signatory to Protocol One of the 1949 Geneva Convention which binds it to refraining from attacks on civilian targets as well as treating captured South African soldiers as prisoners of war. The initiative in persuading the ANC to take this step was taken by the International Red Cross.
11. **The Times**, (London), 13 April 1981 and 14 April 1981.
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15. Robert Petersen, 'Memorandum to the National Executive Committee of SACTU', London, 8 April 1979, p. 20.
16. See Ken Owen, 'War in the Shadows', **Sunday Times**, (Johannesburg), 19 October 1980.
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AIMS, CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL CENSORSHIP EXAMINED

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[Article by Christopher E. Merrett]

[Text]

"Censorship ends in logical completeness when nobody is allowed to read any books except the books nobody can read." ¹

In AD 35, Caligula, fearful of the effect of Greek ideas on Rome, banned Homer's *Odyssey*. In the following nineteen centuries Caligula's spiritual heirs have banned Machiavelli, Shakespeare, Locke, Voltaire, Jefferson, Mill, Zola and Steinbeck among many authors. Indeed the work of almost every writer of worth has been banned at some time, in some place. Such censorship is a classic tool of totalitarian governments; the crime being opposition to the regime. Where the Soviets create the 'unperson' so in South Africa we have the 'banned Communist', the terms Communist and Marxist being used promiscuously by the Government as convenient and damning labels. Totalitarian ideology raises the State, the constitution and its agents to divine heights and sees individual morality and cultural freedom as subversive. Indeed moral questioning is denied to the individual as it has become the preserve of the State. Individual fulfillment through identification with the regime is justified by the semantic contrivance that since the State is the sum of individuals, so its authority is a manifestation of liberty. Of course, this is at odds with the West European tradition, in which a code of rules safeguards a minimum sphere of liberty for each person, protected from the licence of others. Totalitarian regimes long ago realized the advantages of possessing all the 'loudspeakers', by controlling education, the media, and public utterances in general.

Haight writes: "In the history of censorship, the oldest and most frequently recurring controls have been those designed to prevent unorthodox and unpopular expressions of political or religious opinions". ² The aim of this article is to discuss the current nature of such control in South Africa with particular emphasis on book production. This leaves aside the well

known self censorship of the press, enmeshed in a labyrinthine web of laws which require editors to be lawyers rather than journalists, and ensure that the State is the only commentator on certain issues. The State has good reason to fear book and journal production. It controls and monopolizes the educational process, television and radio, while the Press, through fear of the law and the balance sheet is wrapped in its own cocoon of self restraint. Poetry and prose are powerful weapons — above all they have lasting qualities and their circulation can be vast. This is particularly galling to an authoritarian regime which sees literature in strictly utilitarian rather than aesthetic terms, a means to the end of shaping society in its image. However, free thought cannot be entirely eliminated. While people continue to think there will be others willing to record those thoughts, even if these remain unread for a long time. No State can control entirely either thought or writing, an exercise which could be contrasted in its futility with an attempt to swat all the flies in South Africa. Writers form an "island of separateness"³, a powerful threat to the establishment and total social control. In spite of persecution it must be a source of encouragement to writers to know that they are part of an indestructible force even though, for some, their writings will be relevant only to posterity.

Censorship in South Africa was codified in 1963 by the Publications and Entertainments Act which defined the term 'undesirable' in forty different ways but allowed a right of appeal to the Appellate Division, theoretically providing a check on the Publications Control Board by the application of judicial norms. Certainly open court hearings, such as that involving Andre Brink's *Kennis van die aand*, brought the censorship process into public debate. In 1974 the Publications Act abolished this right of appeal and set up its own appeal board. The Directorate of Publications continues to ban on the strength of an isolated part of a work and sees as its task " . . . to uphold a Christian view of life".⁴ The ban on the importation, continued printing, publication, display, retail and circulation of banned items was retained but a new category of 'possession prohibited' was instituted. Initially, transcripts of pleas and evidence which are part of strictly legal publications; technical, scientific and professional publications for the advance of the arts, science and literature; and religious publications, were exempted, but the last two categories were excised by the Publications Amendment Act of 1977. The Directorate of Publications also has the power of seizure and the right to enter premises on the suspicion that an undesirable publication is being printed or published, and the ability to ban all issues of any one title or the output of a specific publisher. The infamous section 47(2) contains the criteria for banning which are: a) obscenity and harm to public morals; b) blasphemy and offence to religious convictions; c) bringing of a section of the community into contempt or ridicule; d) harming relations between sections of the community; e) prejudicing the safety of the State, general welfare, peace and good order; f) disclosing

certain judicial proceedings.

This, however, is not all. Censorship is also enshrined in the internal security legislation which has been built upon the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. This restrains the quoting of banned persons as well as the publications of those banned persons and listed organizations. Up to 31 December 1978, 1358 original banning orders had been served with enormous repercussions on the availability of literature. In addition, the African National Congress (ANC), South African Congress of Democrats, Pan African Congress (PAC), Defence and Aid, South African Communist Party and the African Resistance Movement are proscribed. Among many authors thus affected are Alex Hepple, Fatima Meer, Ronald Segal, Eddie Roux, Donald Woods, Helen Joseph, Brian Bunting, Alex La Guma, Denis Brutus and Ruth First.

It has been fashionable at times to discover humour in some of the more bizarre censorship decisions, most of which date from the early days of Customs embargoes — for example, the restrictions on *Black Beauty* and Hardy's *Return of the native*. Such levity can, however, easily mask the sinister and coldly logical nature of the censorship system. Censorship is not an aberration — it has become an integral part of South African society, one of the many unedifying faces on the obverse of the coin of rugby, braaivleis, sunny skies and Chevrolet. Such suppression of freedom is accepted by a majority of White South Africans with the sheep-like conviction that 'the government must have its reasons' and 'there's no smoke without fire'. In other words, censorship is part of the grand design of apartheid and the 'total onslaught' myth which will not tolerate any questioning of the status quo. If Steiner is correct in saying that the written word is the "primary homeland" ⁵ of the dispossessed, a most tenacious means of communication and an effective opponent of officially sanctioned mass values, the government has a formidable adversary. As Gordimer sums up: "No society in which a tiny minority must govern without consent over a vast majority can afford to submit any part of control of communication . . ." ⁶ It is an apt comment on apartheid that cerebral isolation is apparently essential for its survival, and this is put into context by Royston: "Apartheid is not a catastrophe . . . it is a system of routine deprivation and disruption" ⁷; and Gordimer, who describes censorship as an octopus of thought surveillance. Censorship is part of a system which seeks to bury certain ideas and even to ensure that people are forgotten, as in the case of banned persons. ⁸

Perversely the government appears to think that Blacks are unaware of their own repression and that if censorship controls dissemination of grievances the latter will somehow vaporize. Paternalism is too innocuous a word to describe this process in which the government is using literature as an ideological weapon to reconcile people to the roles in

South African society determined for them on the basis of racial classification. This central myth of the system is supported by censorship such that the latter will not disappear until the mythology is dismantled. Any apparent amelioration of the law simply conceals a shift in purpose. Writers who see themselves as creative individuals, pointing out options for society's future and bringing to society's attention the matters it might prefer to ignore, are bound to clash head on with the totalitarian state. The latter is frightened by the truth and displays the sort of amorality which censors love across racial barriers but permits the gratuitous violence which encourages a war psychosis. Apartheid is based on repression and censorship is a vital cog in that system, using information and thought control to stifle healthy doubt, questioning and cynicism.

It has already been suggested that complete censorship is an impossible objective to fulfil. It is also possible to argue that the South African system is so inefficient that it defeats its own ends, although the writer who read a story from a manuscript in Iowa to find it banned 'publisher unknown' in the Government Gazette, might not agree. Certainly there is a looseness in the system which thwarts total control. For example, when a banned person dies, he or she is unbanned and books become freely available until individually banned by the Directorate of Publications. There is no definitive official publication containing the names of all banned or listed persons. In any case it would be impossible to remove from library shelves every book or journal with references to or by, edited by, or contributed to, by such persons. Furthermore, some titles are banned in hard or soft-back only. The organizational obstacles are massive and policing so difficult that in practice every library has a selection of the thoughts of banned persons on its open shelves. On the other hand the complexity of the Law is such that those who enforce it clearly do not understand all the implications. This is particularly true of bannings under internal security legislation where queries directed to the Department of Justice have simply been ignored. Whether complexity of regulations and a deafening silence in response to questions aid or frustrate liberty is debatable. The resultant uncertainty and even fear would seem to suggest the latter and low usage of banned book collections means that the system works.

The process of banning books can also be seen as self defeating in the sense that it draws attention to titles and endows them with a mysterious power which they might not otherwise deserve. Certainly some of the more turgid Marxist writings might become more alluring because they are known to be out of favour with the regime. Brink draws attention to the fact that censorship can provide stimulation for the writer in a closed society, and make obvious to him what he ought to do. 'When the conspiracy of lies surrounding me demands of me to silence the one word of truth given to me, that word becomes the one word I wish to utter above all others; and at the same time it is the word my metaphy-

sical situation, my historical situation and my own craft demand of me to utter . . .⁹

Writers carry the optimism of the conviction that truth will triumph and that literature can celebrate the true humanity of man as opposed to enforced patterns of behaviour, by identifying with the oppressed and exposing the lie. Indeed Pierre van den Berghe maintains^{9a} that the optimum milieu for a creative intelligensia is an unjust and indefensible society with a moderately and inefficiently repressive regime and an urban population living at above starvation level. Clearly South Africa fits this model, as did Fanon's Algeria, Voltaire's Bourbon France and Tolstoy's Czarist Russia. In addition, he claims, such a political dispensation is tailor made for revolution. It is interesting to note that South African literary prizes are invariably awarded to left wing writers: Achmed Dangor (Mofolo-Plomer prize), Breytenbach and La Guma (Hertzog prize), Le Roux, Brink and Gordimer (CNA prize). As the last writer points out, establishment, right wing South Africa is bankrupt in a literary sense.

Conversely the censorship system has caused many writers to flee South Africa. Such exiles can no longer draw on their experiences or the language and thought of South Africa. The continued control of those who stay has had the effect of driving Black writers underground and reinforcing that wall built between Black experience and grievance and those Whites who wish to know about them. The banning, for example, of *Confused Mhlaba* by Khaya lethu Mqayisa, on the grounds that the play harmed race relations and compromised the safety of the State,¹⁰ showed, according to the defence, that real events were being withheld from White South Africans and that the banning itself hurt race relations as it reduced the potential for mutual understanding. Not only is all South Africa denied access to thinking of radical Black Africa and formative political and social thinking in the Free World, but Whites are to remain ignorant of the feelings of fellow citizens. Literature written by Blacks, dealing in depth with the Black condition, is immediately a target for suppression. Grant comments that to avoid contravening the law you have to be "... either illiterate, philistine or an avid reader of the Government Gazette."¹¹

Nevertheless some courageous publishers continue to print the riskier literature, for example Ad Donker, Ravan, Bateleur and David Philip. In recent years there has been a tendency to turn to poetry. It is less explicit, often cryptic and perhaps less easily understood by the censors, who might in any case expect it to be less popular. It is also quicker to write in an urgent situation and is becoming increasingly political in content, as the banning of James Matthews' *Cry Rage* has shown. Loss of freedom for writers has encouraged loyalty to the struggle against repression, although the resultant jargon is not always the best vehicle for literary expression.

Brink draws attention to the growth of a clandestine lite-

rature on Soviet lines: *tamisdats* (published abroad); and *samisdats* (underground circulation). As in Moscow, literature is an instrument for political change with the surreptitious sale of books on Soweto streets, fly-by-night drama performances, poetry readings and pamphlet distribution. Two thousand copies of *A dry white season* were distributed under the imprint Taurus before Brink's book was banned in an early example of *samisdats* literature. Writers have become agents for political change to the extent that the security police are interested in the chairman of the writers' association, PEN.

It has become common to hear of the liberalization of the censorship system. Such a facile judgement seems to be based on confusion between the interdependence of censorship and apartheid, and a more liberal attitude on the part of the authorities towards nudes and swear words. The release from banning of Gordimer's *Burger's daughter*, Brink's *A dry white season* and Le Roux's *Magersfontein* can be seen as a cynical attempt to buy off White authors and drive a wedge between White and Black writers. That this is merely a change of emphasis is shown by the simultaneous banning of Matshoba's *Call me not a man*. Censorship has become more sophisticated but no less dangerous and the concept of the 'enlightened censor' has no validity. The 'probable reader' has replaced that curious species the 'average South African' as a criterion for assessment and 'quality of literature' has been invoked. In fact this is a smokescreen for crude censorship based on colour — the main consideration is what the Black masses might read as intellectuals articulate those grievances which could otherwise remain unexpressed. Black writing is feared and therefore controlled because it is inspirational. Satire, for example, is now given a freer rein but it is more appropriate to Whites, Blacks being too close to the struggle. Consideration of literary merit is thus a political contrivance, and in any case denies the right for poor quality literature to be read and judged as such. From time to time apologists of censorship try to conjure up a more liberal mood. Leighton, for example, exhorts writers to use fantasy: "If you are not allowed to criticize the government or its agencies, then describe the antics of pigs, as Orwell does in *Animal Farm*." 12

Brink suggests that exceptions have been made of a few well known and coincidentally internationally recognized White writers. This has had the side effect of disseminating radical literature. For example, *Burger's daughter* contains a banned pamphlet of Soweto Students' Council and *Rumours of Rain* reproduces much of the court testimony of Bram Fischer. In a sense writers are donning the mantle of journalist but this is allowed as an exception, fitting neatly into a society run on the basis of permits. There is no liberalization in a system which grants those permits to Whites but denies them to Blacks. Nadine Gordimer refused to appeal against the ban on *Burger's daughter* as this would legitimize the system and South Africa was treated to the bizarre spectacle

of the Directorate of Publications appealing against its own ban to itself. If the severity of the system is an indication of the effectiveness of those it is designed to contain, then it is possible that the authorities feel they have neutralized the radical Whites. Gordimer also claims that White description of Black suffering by proxy is paradoxically acceptable in a way in which similar Black writing is not, thus involving White writers, often unwilling, in a privileged position. The fact that contentious topics may now be discussed if written in a sophisticated idiom in no way obscures the fact that a different psychology is being used towards the same repressive end. Nor has there been a downturn in absolute numbers of bannings. In fact Silver has shown, through a study of the Government Gazette of the period 1974 – 8, a steady increase in the total number, in the proportion of 'possession prohibited' items and the relative number of political bannings. Student publications in particular have been hard hit.

Censorship contains an explicit attack on academic freedom. Welsh asks if it is possible to be a scholar of integrity in South Africa and yet remain within the law. Studies of Marxism and Black nationalism and literature have in particular been obstructed. Academics have to travel abroad to keep up to date and publication is accompanied by extreme nervousness. In the case of banned or listed persons, all their output is proscribed regardless of political or other content. For example, Ruth First's work cannot ordinarily be consulted in South Africa but this includes straightforward history in the form of a biography of Olive Schreiner. For those academics of strong political convictions there is the problem that applications for the use of material legitimize the system. Garson claims that "The greatest danger is the temptation simply to cease asking the questions that can only be answered by using the censored material." 13

It is of course a well known fact that authoritarian regimes enlist the general public as willing or unwilling, witting or unwitting, agents of the control process. Such an ambitious rein on free thought and its dissemination would hardly otherwise be possible. Prominent among the agents of the censorship system is the librarian, who administers the process by which access, for bona fide study purposes, is possible to banned material. An academic library's open exemption permits the use of banned books within the library or makes them available for loan on the authority of a supervisor, subject to a certain amount of form filling, and restrictions on access and photocopying. Similarly the exemption helps academics who wish to acquire such books for academic research purposes. In the case of 'possession prohibited' and internal security bannings, a library has to seek permission to hold each title. Such titles may only be used for study purposes after individual application to the Directorate of Publications or Department of Justice as appropriate, a Catch 22 situation which requires the motivation to use a book which by definition has yet to be seen by the user. The response of librarians to this system has been varied. Some have aided and abetted censorship by

acting in a timid fashion, placing restrictions on or simply failing to order books which might be banned. Three libraries in the South African Library Association survey of 1978 did not include banned books in the main catalogue and a number use unnecessarily complex issue systems. Such circumspect actions effectively build a second censorship system on top of the government's. The library profession as a whole likes to pride itself on its unified opposition to censorship. This apparent liberal standpoint begins to ring hollow when it is closely examined, for it comprises a call to the Government to amalgamate censorship legislation under one Act, so that all banned material may be listed in the Government Gazette and Jacobsen's Index. In other words it is a desire for administrative tidiness which would make the task of the librarian easier and perhaps lessen possible tension between librarian and library user; but it contains no real attack on an undemocratic and unacademic system, and thus compromises with repression. Few librarians have thought beyond the issue of academic inconvenience, to the real issues facing society. The recent introduction into South African librarianship training of 'library philosophy and ethics' might attract some respect if it were to concern itself with the implications of the totalitarian state for the library. In addition to librarians, booksellers have now been inveigled into the system. The Department of Customs and Excise embargo on books is to end and booksellers will receive material direct. The fact that the booksellers will be liable to retrospective prosecution for stocking banned books, and even the cancellation of licences as a punishment, suggests that a self censorship system will be erected on top of that recorded in the Government Gazette. Booksellers will understandably be concerned with financial survival rather than political freedom. The Government has subtly shifted the onus for the policing of its censorship system to a non official agency. This is all the more significant when bearing in mind the increasing difficulties in staffing and effectively administering the massive bureaucracy which runs apartheid South Africa.

The question of self induced censorship has implications for publishing as a whole. The insistent hammering of the propaganda machine in general and the complexity of the censorship system in particular, have encouraged the assumption in the public mind that rights are even more restricted than the law actually allows. Thus is developed the caution in librarians and booksellers noted above, and so are destroyed basic beliefs in civil rights taken for granted in the Free World. For example, in 1971 Oxford University Press published the second volume of the Oxford history of South Africa and excluded from the 'South African edition' Leo Kuper's contribution 'African nationalism in South Africa, 1910 -- 1964'. Kuper had spent two years preparing this work and points out that self censorship in his case would not only have been academically dishonest, but actually impossible given the topic. A scholarly account of the ANC is impossible without quoting the aims of the organization.

OUP and the editors took the decision to omit the chapter from the 'South African edition' and substitute blank pages. In this case, as Kuper maintains, the publishers rather than the South African government were the censors, an act of self abnegation made to seem all the more ludicrous since the 'International edition' has never been banned, and can be bought, in South Africa. OUP explained that they felt that South African law could be infringed by publishing Kuper's work which illustrates well the three stage development of censorship: official action; writers' self censorship; and an inhibiting control by non government bodies. Barend van Niekerk describes the last as "... abdication in anticipation ...", with a "... tendency to extend the scope of impermissibility to a point well beyond the demands of the law." 15. The weight of repressive law in the last twenty five years has been such that "... (it) may at times appear to be impregnated by religious or mystical norms." 16

The 1974 Publications Act emphatically removed the censorship system from the rule of law, primarily by denying the right of appeal. Although the broad outlines of the system are enshrined in law, its administration and policing are carried out by a bureaucracy answerable only to itself, dedicated to the imposition of mass values and denial of the right to question. As with other areas of apartheid legislation it is pertinent to query the degree of congruence between the intent of the law and its implementation by bureaucrats. Bureaucratic interpretation may vary with the time and demands of a particular situation, but at all times we are being told what is good for us in the name of a spurious vox populi. Such an edifice is tailor made for the dominance of sectional interests. The chairman of the government appointed Directorate of Publications can dictate literary norms so as to "... impose the greatest restraint on expression and the search for truth ... (ushering) in an era of intellectual torpor." 17

Censorship is one of the oldest tricks of the totalitarian trade, designed to counter the immense power of the written word and turn it to the advantage of the regime. Control of literature is an integral and cynical part of the apartheid system, even though some of the results may be counterproductive. The suggestion that censorship is being liberalized is a misreading of an attempt by the South African government to placate Whites and international opinion or, even more sinister, to split the literary World on racial lines. Of course it is a direct challenge to civil rights in general and academic freedom in particular. The practical problems inherent in the policing of such a vast system have led to the implicit recruitment of librarians, booksellers and publishers as its agents. Its success has largely stemmed from its bewildering complexity. South Africans do not expect to have rights and where these are obscured they are generally assumed not to exist. Caution is the watchword, such that self censorship by writers and publishers has created a climate as effective as the official banning system itself; or censorship within

the censorship system. Above all of course is the erosion of the rule of law, substituted by a bureaucracy answerable to nothing but a prevailing and sectional ideology. The Government and its Directorate of Publications can be likened to the proverbial blind man and his deaf friend. Significantly they would like us to be blind and deaf as well, but it is unlikely that they rather than radical writers will be vindicated by posterity. History has already shown the staying power of the written word. □

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BRITISH TV FEATURE ON AGGETT DEATH DENOUNCED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Apr 82 p 6

[Editorial: "Sneak TV"]

[Text]

A BRITISH television team has surreptitiously filmed a feature on the death of Dr Neil Aggett, the trade union leader who died in detention on February 5.

It's the kind of film that is guaranteed to do South Africa the maximum harm. We condemn both the contents and the manner of obtaining them.

For one thing, there is nothing clever in a TV team coming here under false pretences, its members passing themselves off as tourists, thus avoiding the necessity of obtaining work permits, which is what all foreign journalists have to get. For another, Dr Aggett's death will be the subject of an inquest and for anyone to prejudge the matter by suggesting, as the film does, that his death was murder is outrageous.

It is easy to cry "murder," as some trade unionists did in the heat of the moment when Dr Aggett's death became known, but medical and other expert evidence is necessary before the cause and circumstances of Dr Aggett's death can be established.

This evidence will only be available when the inquest is held.

Until then, the matter is sub judice, and the South African Embassy's information director in London was right, in the circumstances, to condemn the producers of the film.

"We regard the programme as premature and prejudicial to the findings of the inquest (which starts on April 13)," he said.

"Evidence will be submitted to a properly constituted court of law and investigated according to accepted judicial practices.

"We therefore reject this programme as constituting trial by television ... The

programme does not serve the cause of justice."

It does, of course, serve the cause of the anti-South African hate lobby, and we have no doubt that the TV team's aim was to produce a film that would harm this country.

Two reasons

There are two reasons for saying this. The first is that the team sneaked in here, well knowing that the matter had still to be tested in court, and the other is that the team only approached the South African Embassy in London for comment after it had returned from South Africa.

There can be no objectivity when such a surreptitious and prejudiced approach is made to producing a documentary.

Two other aspects concern us. The team interviewed Dr Aggett's parents, sister and girl friend.

We can assume that they are still so upset about Dr Aggett's death that they would accept, without question, and without being aware of the consequences, the chance to state their fears about his death.

Mrs Helen Suzman, the PFP Member for Houghton, has enough experience of similar programmes to know that anything she says will be used in an anti-South African context by a television team such as this one even if this was not what she intended.

Mrs Suzman quoted from a letter from a detainee which she previously read in the Assembly, and which contained allegations concerning the treatment of Dr Aggett.

These allegations, as she well knows, have not been tested — and we are not even sure that they will be submitted to the inquest court.

We are sorry she took part in this clandestine programme, especially as she knew the team were here without official blessing.

Finally, the sneak film could result in an outright ban on Thames Television crews entering South Africa.

We are sick and tired of the clandestine filming of South African issues in a way that is calculated to harm this country. An example should be made of Thames Television in this particular instance.

Its crews should be banned from coming here for a specified period — and if they do sneak in here again, the strongest possible action should be taken against them and their company.

WAY PAVED FOR EXTREME RIGHT-WING TAKEOVER OF PRETORIA COUNCIL

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Apr 82 p 9

[Article by Keith Abendroth]

[Text]

STRONG and active lobbying behind the Pretoria City Council scenes could conceivably pave the way to an extreme Right Wing takeover of the city's administration.

It is understood that 11 city councillors have either already thrown their weight behind Dr Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party, or are considered to be on the point of doing so.

And Municipal sources say if they were to form a loose coalition with the six Herstigte Nasionale Party councillors, power could be wrested from the National Party backed Federation of Ratepayers' Association.

Such a move would give the Rightwing 17 of the council's 36 seats — but three of the remaining 19 seats are held by the Progressive Federal Party.

Thus the 16 remaining

National Party backed — but theoretically nonpolitical — councillors could find themselves wooing the three lone PFP members in a bid to maintain a more verligte image for the council.

Sources said that the Treurnicht party was receiving considerable support in the council, and indications are clear that the 11 possible and certain CP supporting councillors could break away to form a new political pressure group in the council.

However, according to CP councillors, it is not likely at this stage that any CP-orientated councillors would link up with the HNP councillors.

Known council members of the CP said yesterday that they were committed to continue working within the framework of the federation's policy.

STEPS TO COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT EXAMINED

Pretoria ISSUP STRATEGIC REVIEW in English Feb 82 pp 13-24

[Article by Dr F Ackron: "Revolutionary Potential and Counter-Measures in the South African Situation"]

[Text]

In recent years, considerable research has been devoted to the subject of revolution. Attentions now focussed on why revolutions occur, whereas earlier studies concentrated on aspects such as different types of revolution, the history of revolution and the intensity and duration of revolution. Despite extensive literature on the subject, the term itself causes much confusion, particularly when it is necessary to make a distinction between revolutions and phenomena such as riots, rebellions, uprisings, *coups d'etat* and palace revolutions. Most definitions, however, agree that the essential quality of revolution is the effort to obtain political power by way of illegitimate collective violence in order to effect societal change within a relatively short span of time.¹⁾ Virtually all definitions and classifications of revolution are likely to be labelled incomplete, because of the numerous forms in which the phenomenon appears. What concerns essentially democratic societies is that revolutionaries resort to violence in order to effect change which could as well be achieved by peaceful means. Although violence as a solution to problems is more acceptable in some societies than in others, it usually indicates that other attempted solutions have failed.²⁾

Although it is difficult to visualize any society without conflict, the use of collective violence to resolve that conflict indicates that politics in the particular society has failed.³⁾ Since the purpose of political institutions and procedures is the resolution of conflict by means of mutually acceptable measures. Whenever the use of violence as a means to resolve political problems becomes widespread, the question remains as to why men accept it as a political tool.

At the outset it is important to state that the use of violence to solve political problems can hardly be attributed to a single cause,⁴⁾ but it certainly centres upon the individual in society, experiencing the world in many dimensions and connected to other individuals through many interpersonal relationships. To find an answer to the question, therefore, factors and situations which may cause people to resort to violent behaviour on the political plane, should be identified. Since the human being is not a creature of the moment only, it is necessary to classify these factors and situations into two broad categories: long-term factors serving as a background to violent behaviour, and short-term factors and situations which act as precipitating agents in sparking off violent behaviour.⁵⁾

People function and experience frustration (to which they may react with aggression) in different spheres, such as the political, the economic and the cultural/social. The cause for violent behaviour should therefore not be sought in the political sphere alone. Often the causes for violent political behaviour may in fact be economic or cultural and social.

1 LONG-TERM OR BACKGROUND FACTORS

1.1 Economic factors and situations

Although a single tier economic situation, such as progressive impoverishment may lead to frustration and aggression,⁶⁾ it seems that two-tier economic situations have a larger potential for the creation of such reactions in people. One example of such a two-tier economic situation is when success is experienced in one sector of the economy, or by one section of the population, but is not matched by the same amount of success in other sectors or sections. In such a situation expectations are created which, when disappointed, may lead to frustration and possible aggression.⁷⁾ A change in environment leading to a change in values is thus not followed by the required next round of environmental change. Another two-tier economic situation which forms a background to political violence, is a reasonably long period of economic development, creating expectations which carry their own risks, followed by a relatively short but sharp recession, which shatters expectations and proves certain risks to have been underestimated. This makes the price for the lack of foresight too high.⁸⁾ In such a situation the gap between expectations regarding need-fulfilment and actual need-fulfilment becomes unacceptably wide and causes frustration which, when widely dispersed and of sufficient intensity, may lead to aggressive behaviour.⁹⁾ Finally, in times of economic prosperity, the individual can afford to turn his attention to matters other than the economic, of which he was not previously aware, and give vent to his discontentment with such matters by way of violent behaviour.¹⁰⁾

In South Africa, as in most Western countries, inflation affects all population groups, eroding their standards of living, but in absolute terms hits those in the lower income groups harder than others. This is especially significant because the lower income groups consist mainly of non-Whites whose average earnings are significantly lower than those of Whites. During 1979 the average annual income for Whites was R7 627, for Asians R3 280 and for Blacks R1 831.¹¹⁾ Many non-Whites are thus subjected to progressive impoverishment. Although Whites may be in the same position, the higher White income can absorb rising prices of necessities more easily. This situation reflects also the relative higher economic success of the Whites, to whose financial position non-Whites aspire, only to find their aspirations constantly thwarted by inflation and its results.

Some non-Whites are successful, and efforts to create a Black middle class in the urban areas are specifically directed towards the goal of general economic well being among the Black urban population. Commendable as such efforts are, they may lead to frustration on other non-economic levels, giving rise to aggression. Economic problems are especially significant in the creation of frustration and discontent, as they have a personal or individual relevance and cause discomfort which cannot be ignored save at the cost of health and well being.

Efforts to raise the standard of living of non-Whites are presently made by government as well as certain sections of the private sector, but these are as yet not adequate. Direct involvement by the private sector and

private individuals has to be increased enormously. Non-Whites, however, have also to accept their responsibility in areas such as training and family planning. Here, they can render invaluable assistance.

1.2 Cultural and social factors and situations

These factors and situations may be viewed from a macroscopic or microscopic perspective.¹²⁾

At the macroscopic level, attention is usually focused on those who accept violence as a means of problem-solving, although the groups who reject this attitude are certainly equally important. Attention will be focused on these latter groups (that are likely to be represented by the incumbent government and its supporters), in the section on political factors and situations.

When viewed from a macroscopic perspective, the perception of the situation by those supporting violence, is of crucial importance. Since discontent exists in any social system and likewise those prepared to resort to violence because of discontent, their perception of the likelihood of success to be achieved by violence is an important determining factor in their decision to make use of it.¹³⁾ One can assert therefore that violent behaviour is born from hope and not despair.¹⁴⁾ This hope, to be meaningful, has however, to be linked to a vision of a better, more just and equitable situation, envisaged in some kind of programme of reform.

In this reform programme the ultimate aim of the violent behaviour is formulated and the attention drawn to the shortcomings of the *status quo*. The programme is usually biased and emotional and methods of approaching the goal are usually elaborated simultaneously. The programme of reform may justifiably be labelled an ideology.¹⁵⁾ The ideology or programme of reform, has a unifying function, uniting those who accept violence as their means of problem-solving.

In the formulation and dissemination of the ideology, the intellectual elite often play a decisive role. They may also contribute to the creation of a feeling of dissatisfaction by pin-pointing the shortcomings of the social system. The intellectuals are moreover largely involved in educating the young, an important factor because younger people usually form the majority of those who resort to violence.¹⁶⁾

Often the hope of success, together with a programme of reform, is not sufficient for significant numbers in a society to resort to violence. Although leaders may only emerge after the initial violence has erupted, they still are an indispensable part of any programme of violent action.¹⁷⁾ The relationship between the leaders and the situation is often of a dialectic nature, as the leaders are necessary for the perpetuation of violent action, and violent action often creates the leaders.¹⁸⁾

A further factor that might be conducive to the use of violence as a means of obtaining objectives is a low level of educational attainment in the community.¹⁹⁾ This means that developing communities would be more susceptible than highly industrialized and developed communities,²⁰⁾ though the case of France during 1968 proves that no developed community is immune to violent action by relatively large numbers of the populace. Highly traditional communities seem likewise to suffer less from violent disturbance, though most communities nowadays are divided between a highly modernized group on the one hand and the less modernized masses on the other.²¹⁾ Furthermore, no community is stagnant, and the tensions of modernization will be felt in most communities to a greater or lesser extent. It is noteworthy that communities with a rigid stratification between the "master group" or "top dogs" and the "servant group" or "underdogs"

are more susceptible to violence as a means of change than societies with a less rigid and more open interaction structure.²² The lower echelons of the top group and the upper echelons of the bottom group play a significant role in group conflict. These groups experience relative deprivation, manifested as fundamental social injustice, and individuals in these groups can thus be viewed as rank disequibrated.²³ It is the individual, as stated earlier, who reacts to frustration with aggression which turns attention to the cultural and social factors which may cause revolution, considered from a microscopic point of view.

It seems that the most common cause for anger at the individual level is the thwarting of opportunities to satisfy basic human needs. Not all human needs are basic however and frustration of basic needs does not, in any case, always lead to violent reaction.²⁴ Maslow's theory of human motivation arranges needs in a hierarchy of priority and potency ranging from the most powerful physiological needs to those for safety, love, esteem, self actualization, and cognitive and aesthetic needs.²⁵ According to this theory, as needs at a particular level are satisfied, those at the next press for satisfaction.²⁶ No human being can, however, be fully satisfied in his needs, nor can the urge for need satisfaction, short of killing a person, be suppressed. Furthermore, for collective violence to emerge, people do not have to experience frustration of the same need. Individuals experiencing frustration of need satisfaction at different levels of the need hierarchy, may unite for violent action.

Motery postulate that the possibility for violent action arises when need satisfaction is thwarted. It is a tentative explanation for the occurrence of a situation of collective violence. *Why* does the gap between expected need satisfaction and actual need satisfaction become unacceptably wide, does such a possibility arise? In his efforts to satisfy his needs the individual engages in goal directed activity. When he is thwarted in this activity, frustration is experienced, and aggression is often directed at the cause of the frustration. (though aggression is certainly not the only possible response).

When people perceive a discrepancy between the goods and conditions of life to which they believe they are rightfully entitled and what they think they are capable of obtaining or preserving, they experience relative deprivation.²⁷ Different variables determine the magnitude of the anger following frustration in goal directed behaviour, and the more severe the relative deprivation, the greater the likelihood and intensity of collective violence.²⁸ Similarly, the strength of anger:

- (i) tends to vary directly with the intensity of commitment to the goal in respect of which deprivation is experienced or anticipated,²⁹ (the intensity of the commitment to a goal or condition tends to vary inversely with its perceived closeness)³⁰ and
- (ii) tends to vary directly with the degree of effort previously expended in the attainment of the goal or the maintenance of the condition.³¹ A further qualifying proposition is that the strength of anger tends to vary inversely with the extent to which deprivation is regarded as legitimate.³² The strength of anger will vary with the perceived distance between the value position sought or enjoyed and the attainable or residual value position,³³ as well as varying "directly with the proportion of all available opportunities for value attainment with which interference is experienced or anticipated".³⁴

Thus, the perception of the situation by the individual is crucial, whatever the "objective" assessment may be, and it is not only deprivation

actually experienced that is a source of anger, but also expected or anticipated deprivation³⁶⁾ and that, for the possibility of collective violence to become a reality feelings of disappointment in living conditions need to be focused on the political institutions, manifested as a feeling of alienation from those institutions³⁷⁾.

It appears that the feelings of dissatisfaction underlying anger in society, should not be present only among the masses but also within the leaders whose expertise and resources are necessary³⁸⁾ for collective violence to be successful.

The resort to collective violent action in a society is therefore the result of social disequilibrium where the environment and values of actors within the system no longer synchronize,⁴⁰⁾ when what people expect of the system is no longer compatible with what they can obtain and where violence seems the only means left to synchronize expectations with reality.

The Republic of South Africa is a developing country, prone to disequilibrating factors in human attitudes, because values and ideas change faster than the institutional background. In South Africa supporters of violence as a means to problem solving are terrorist and communist groups that are closely linked. They have a ready-made ideology with a critique of the present situation — in classical Marxian terms of haves and have nots — as well as a vision of a new dispensation. They carry on their work of persuasion, often assisted by dissident intellectuals of all population groups. The unrest experienced during the past few years at non-White schools and universities certainly testifies to this.

These groups are not leaderless. Banned organisations have offices in neighbouring states from where their propaganda and subversive efforts are directed. Leaders on all levels in the non-White community, often vehemently publicly denounce the present situation. To this is added a critical, often belligerent world opinion, manifested in declarations of the United Nations Organization and other foreign organizations.

The educational attainment level of the non-White groups is low compared to that of the Whites. In the White sector 15.4% of the males and 15.5% of the females have diplomas or degrees, whereas only 1.1% of both sexes in this group have no qualifications at all. In the case of Coloureds only 1.4% of the males and 2.9% of the females have diplomas or degrees, and for Asians these figures rise to 3.4% for males and 4.6% for females. With Blacks, the figure for urban males is 0.3% and 0.4% for their rural counterparts. For Black females in urban areas the figure rises to 1.3% while only 0.8% of those in the rural areas fall in this category. The picture is still bleaker when the figures for those who have no qualifications at all are taken into consideration — 24.7% of Coloured males, 18.1% of Coloured females, 6.7% of Asian males, 16.1% of Asian females, 39.9% of urban Black males, 65.4% of rural Black males and 22.6% of urban Black females and 60.5% of their rural counterparts fall in this category.⁴¹⁾ Against the background of the unrest at non-White educational institutions, the destruction of schoolrooms and educational material, and the loss of valuable time for scholars and students, these figures should cause concern, not only for the direct effect on frustration and aggression, but also for the indirect effect through the eventual reduced economic worth of individuals in a highly competitive system.

Governmental measures to establish and reduce the cause for discontent at non-White educational institutions have been undertaken. The establishment of parity in certain categories of non-White teachers' salaries with those of their White counterparts is one such measure. Better training for non-White teachers is likewise envisaged. The long-term alleviation of the situation is perhaps to be sought in instituted compulsory training, as

is the case for Whites. In this field economic factors create many problems such as the availability of amenities and the ability of non-White parents to finance their children's educational requirements. Government action alone cannot possibly be sufficient to ease the problem.

A further complicating cultural and social factor is that the South African population can easily be divided into two groups, a top group in which most of the country's expertise and the largest part of the national per capita income is to be found, and a predominantly non-White lower group lacking education and with a subsequently lower per capita income. Both groups can be subdivided into upper and lower categories, likely to suffer rank disequilibrium because of rising expectations among the ascenders of the lower group and status and situation fears from the lower stratum of the upper group. Fortunately limited geographical and social mobility for the ascending members of the lower group does exist and is a powerful mediating factor.⁴² Members of the lower echelons of the upper group may, however, react unfavourably to social mobility. These problems may be overcome by the proposed new labour dispensation; but increased economic possibilities for non-Whites will have to be matched by the eradication of discrimination on other levels, as these may then become even more conspicuous and frustrating.

Concern is often expressed for the frustration experienced by the lower income groups on the level of the satisfaction of basic needs. In the South African situation frustration may also be experienced in the need for esteem, because of discriminatory and offensive laws, rules, regulations and practices. Such practices often persist even after the particular statutory measures have ceased to exist. Informal discrimination is as much part of the scene as the formal variant of this phenomenon.

Although little has been done to establish the extent to which feelings of relative deprivation exist in society, it is likely that such feelings do exist. Evidence of this is often found in demands of non-White leaders and pupils during the school boycotts,⁴³ and of strikers during industrial strikes, 104 of which occurred during 1979.⁴⁴ Whether an objective situation of relative deprivation does exist is immaterial in the present context, as it is the individual's perception of the situation that is crucial.

White leaders can create a situation of expected relative deprivation, through statements of what the future is to hold, as happened frequently during the last general election. The position of non-Whites featured prominently during the election campaign, and the mass media tended to stress these predictions. Some of them could have raised doubts about the future among non-Whites and be construed as evidence of White intransigence.

Indeed some Whites had visions of reversing the present situation and returning to conditions of decades ago. Tensions can also only be aggravated by factors such as a total of 224 910 arrests of males and 49 977 arrests of females under the pass laws during 1978.⁴⁵ Another cause of concern is the number of people involved in threat to the security of the state, for example 768 detentions for security reasons during the greater part of 1980.⁴⁶

Statistics and figures should be treated with circumspection, but it does seem that in the South African society, frustration due to thwarted expectations exists. The ethnic character of the society complicates the issue because it is all too easy to blame skin colour, or to use ethnic origin to explain situations actually caused by other factors.

During the recent elections, members of the government repeatedly stated that discriminatory and offensive legislation is to be reviewed, and steps to effect this have already been undertaken. Although the cleavage

between classes in society is still conspicuous, a general openness in society can be perceived, also noticeable in the attitudes of most leaders of all races. At present, despite several background factors conducive to collective violence in the South African society, a large reservoir of goodwill certainly does exist. This should be utilized immediately, in efforts to grant each South African, whatever his colour or creed, those opportunities for need satisfaction without which no individual can truly be happy and content.

1.3 Political factors and situations

Foreign control of a country may be a contributing factor to collective violence, especially when national feeling emerges and the control is regarded as degrading and unjust.⁴⁷⁾ Such a situation may then result in a so-called "war of liberation".

Internally the weaknesses and inefficiency of the ruling élite may also contribute to feelings of frustration, followed by aggressive behaviour.⁴⁸⁾ Among the factors causing weakness and inefficiency are conflict from within, wavering and incongruous policies, the alienation of the armed forces, uncontrollable inflation, military and diplomatic defeat, and corruption and subversion.⁴⁹⁾ Not only can the shortcomings and inability of the ruling elite lead to collective violence, but also their intransigence.⁵⁰⁾ This usually causes frustration and aggression in rigidly stratified societies, with governing positions filled and jealously guarded by members of the "top" group. Social demands or imperatives are often ignored, because the ruling elite is unwilling, rather than unable, to meet them.

The ruling elite's unwillingness to react to demands for change may increase the incidence of violence, especially when the ideology teaches that change is inevitable.⁵¹⁾ Lip service by the ruling group to necessary reform or demands for change creates a discrepancy between expectations and reality, culminating in frustration and aggression.⁵²⁾

Whenever members of the ruling elite continually oppose reform, the possibility of peaceful change is lost, and collective violence is then the only alternative left.⁵³⁾ The ruling elite may block channels for peaceful protest and constitutional change,⁵⁴⁾ violence thereby becoming the only alternative. Lastly, the extensive use of violence by the ruling elite may create a situation where violence is met with violence.⁵⁵⁾ In a stable society people succeed in living together because of accepted and expected behaviour patterns. Violence is behaviour to which others cannot orientate themselves.⁵⁶⁾ The extensive use of it by a government can create an unpredictable situation. Resulting frustration and tension may lead to aggression and alienate members of the community from governmental institutions and officials.

The government in the Republic is certainly not weak and inefficient, but conflicting statements by national leaders about internal policies, especially where non-Whites are concerned, give rise to uncertainty and frustration and may even be interpreted as signs of serious internal conflict in the ruling elite.

Members of government and other officials constantly state the necessity for change and occasionally expound plans for change, often however, without statements about the time-period over which the change is to be effected. This creates false hopes among non-Whites about the speed at which changes can be implemented. When such changes do not occur immediately, non-Whites become disillusioned — as is often apparent from statements by non-White leaders. Delay is interpreted as intransigence or mere lip service to required change. When proposed

changes are announced it should therefore be pointed out that such changes can seldom be effected within short periods of time. It may even be wise to indicate the length of time required whenever such an indication is possible.

In the stratified South African community it is seldom realized that statements made by Whites or non-Whites are not necessarily endorsed by the majority of the members of the group to which the spokesman belongs. In this respect White as well as non-White leaders often make statements that could lead to much confusion, misinterpretation and frustration. Leaders should therefore take cognizance of the possible consequences of their statements and audiences should regard statements of individuals in the light of who they are.

A general climate conducive to the use of collective violence can be created by many factors and situations. Such a climate may endure for an extended period. Any occurrence often superficially quite trivial, may, however, spark off the situation, acting as a catalyst or precipitating factor.

2 PRECIPITATING OR SHORT-TERM FACTORS

Precipitating factors may be of any nature and may "objectively" not warrant the reaction that follows their occurrence. When and where such a precipitating factor may occur and what the nature of it maybe, is therefore almost impossible to predict. Whatever the precipitating factor, it has no potency unless long-term factors have prepared a situation conducive to violent behaviour within which it may function.

The perception of frustrated individuals in this regard also seems to be decisive. If the precipitating factor leads them to believe that the incumbent government is no longer capable of maintaining its position of supremacy, or alternatively, that they have a chance of achieving success through collective violence,²⁰ they will resort to the use of violence, however irrational their beliefs may be. Such individuals believe that violence is the only possible or available method of achieving their objectives.

Any situation which has a fair amount of emotional content may spark off the use of collective violence. Such situations may vary from the detention of an influential leader to the removal of squatters from squatter camps. On the other hand even a situation almost totally devoid of emotional content, such as an extremely successful bomb attack may act as a precipitating factor. What is therefore important is to attempt to eliminate background factors conducive to the use of collective violence.

3 SUMMARY

A revolutionary situation where violence as a means of problem solving is widely resorted to, can be created by a mixture of short-term and long-term factors. It is almost impossible to identify or classify short-term or precipitating factors. The background factors can be economic, cultural, social or political. The action of governments is crucial as it is involved on all levels of life in modern society, but the action of ordinary members of society cannot be ignored. Although it is possible to analyse revolution in general terms, the perception and experience of the individual protagonist is the ultimate factor. It is on the level of the living person that the causes of revolution are to be sought and eradicated. South African society has certain aspects conducive to revolutionary action, but these need not be ac-

ceived as given. Problems in these areas can be alleviated if not eradicated. No society is static and new situations of dissatisfaction and frustration, new possibilities of violent action, are bound to arise. They in turn will require new efforts to eradicate or at least minimize them. Ongoing efforts to create good will on the basis of shared humanity and mutual respect are essential. The needs, values and aspirations of others who, in one society, share a common destiny must be appreciated. Once collective violence is resorted to in order to solve problems which could have been solved peacefully, the prospect for all is bleak indeed. Whenever efforts are directed at eradicating conditions that cause dissatisfaction and frustration, it is important to remember that the individuals personality functions on different levels; therefore not only economic grievances deserve attention, but also social-cultural and political grievances, for life is not experienced as a series of compartmentalized events, but as an interrelated meaningful whole.

The responsibility of minimizing the possibilities of an outbreak of collective violence is not that of government alone, but also of the private sector, and indeed of every serious South African, whatever his colour or creed. The acceptance of personal responsibility for the successful functioning of the system is a *sine qua non*. Society is after all no supra-organic structure, but so many individuals trying to work out an acceptable, worthwhile dispensation for all.

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ASCENDENCE OF MILITARY FORCE OVER DIPLOMACY TRACED

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[Article by A du Plessis: "Diplomacy or Military Force? Theoretical Perspectives of a Southern African Policy Dilemma"]

[Text]

The current diplomatic offensive in search of an acceptable international solution to the SWA/Namibia issue, and a revision of the present political dispensation in South Africa, as well as the increase in the scope and intensity of organized violence and related military activities throughout Southern Africa, has had the cumulative effect of accentuating the classical war/peace dichotomy found in political relations. In the Southern African context, this has resulted in a dilemma increasingly relevant to decision makers and executors of policy alike. The problem centres on the critical choice between peaceful or non-peaceful means to achieve external and internal policy goals, whether these be evolutionary change or maintaining the *status quo*.

Although it has domestic policy implications, the fundamental issue underlying this decisional predicament is the relationship and interdependency of political and military means in the implementation of foreign policy. These relationships are not only indicative of the structure of and interactions within the Southern African subsystem, but also have a deterministic effect on future subsystem structure and interaction. Discussion of these phenomena, will require an exposition of the theoretical principal underlying the use and interrelatedness of diplomacy and military force.

A comprehensive and in depth analysis of the relevance and consequences of this problem to South African decision-makers is not intended. It is, however, the expressed aim to ascertain the fundamental principles underlying this end-means relationship, and to attempt some evaluation of the measures selected. This is essential in order to determine whether present guidelines for state action are acceptable, or whether future guidelines can be construed or prescribed if those currently used are unsatisfactory.

1 THE CENTRALITY OF CONFLICT

Regional conflict in Southern Africa has become an intermittent, although seemingly unavoidable component of subsystems interaction. Because conflict is the net result of political actors simultaneously pursuing and fulfilling objectives, the elimination of conflicts has become a primary goal.¹⁾ As a result, war and peace tend to form a continuum of means by which individual state interests, as well as the collective ideal of order and stability

in the international system are strived after. Conflict can be divided into two broad categories, non-violent conflict involving pacific measures such as diplomacy or coercive methods short of actual war, and violent conflict involving forcible military measures and war.¹⁰

A distinctive duality determines the nature of conflict and the instruments used. War is a military instrument of state policy, often utilized. It is also a primary determinant of the structure of the international political system, and an important manifestation of social disorder that can constitute a dire threat unless limited and contained.¹¹ Similarly, diplomacy as a political instrument of state policy, constitutes an important approach to world peace as a viable alternative to a more military orientated approach. In practice, the choice of violent or non-violent measures is determined by the objectives envisaged, and influenced by environmental factors in the particular area over which control or influence is desired.

2. ENDS-MEANS DETERMINISM

Once a decision maker has identified his objectives, he will select appropriate means of implementing his decisions in accordance with the availability of capabilities for action. The instruments for implementing foreign policy decisions are multiform. States will normally use diplomacy, reinforced by economic, psychological, and military pressures. Collectively this represents the totality of action choice utilised in international politics. However, confidence is not entirely placed upon any single instrument. To attain an objective, all four categories are simultaneously integrated in proportions calculated to bring about the desired state of affairs as effectively as possible. The *correct* instrument will be the one that *best* serves state purposes. Paradoxically, there is no substantive difference between military and other instruments. If effectiveness in producing acceptable results is taken as a standard of appropriateness, both diplomacy and military measures are *normal* in interstate relations.¹²

Although the aim will be to maintain flexibility, the choice of means is largely determined by set ends. The more definitive objectives are, the less flexible they become and the more deterministic in influencing the choice of means. In this respect a distinction is drawn between diffuse and fused objectives. Diffuse objectives refer to a situation where no clear hierarchy among end-goals exists, while fused objectives relate to fixed hierarchies in the determining of objectives. Because of the relative flexibility of diffuse objectives, the spectrum of feasible accommodative devices broadens. Inversely, a rigid hierarchy of objectives not only limits the suitability of instruments available, but by implication often prescriptively determines the use of specific instruments.

An appraisal of the more specific and value-oriented goals of South African foreign policy, shows them to centre on security, and material and ideological policy objectives. These are central goals which are inclined to become final and absolute,¹³ thereby obtaining a fused nature. This aspect is particularly important if objectives are related to the broader categorization of goals, i.e. goals of national self-extension, goals of national self-preservation, and goals of national self-abnegation.¹⁴ Although the South African government professes to pursue goals of self-preservation or at least goals of self-extension positively, critics of government policy do not readily agree on this. Internally, especially on the right of the political spectrum, the government is accused of a policy of self-abnegation. Diametrically opposed to this is the leftist accusation, that South Africa is set upon the realization of goals of national self-extension in a negative or

derogatory sense.

In reality, the truth probably lies between these two extremes, depending on the results achieved by diplomatic and military instruments respectively. A valid question for all political decision-makers in Southern Africa, is whether conflict objectives pertain to regional, balancing-objective conflict, or regional hegemonic-objective conflict. The purpose of the former is the restoration of a disturbed balance, of the latter domination rather than equilibrium.⁹ Because *apartheid* is a related and controversial factor in the SWA/Namibia dispute, independent of mutual interests in other policy areas, the balancing objective still seems to dominate conflict in the Southern African context. If the extent of current politico-military measures, supported by psychological warfare on an ideological plane, is considered as a basis for evaluation, the aforementioned perception of the nature of the conflict may be questioned however. Serious consideration should be given to the hypothesis that the conflict objectives in the regional context, have transcended the balancing ideal and fallen within the framework of hegemonic objectives.

The verification or refutation of this viewpoint requires an extensive analysis outside the scope of this article. Only the general principles underlying the contemporary use of diplomatic instruments and their appropriateness, shall be considered.

3 THE DECLINE OF DIPLOMACY

As national goals are always political, all foreign policy instruments ought to be of a political nature. Diplomacy, however, is traditionally regarded as the political instrument of state action. In general terms, diplomacy refers to a specific pacific approach, or a method by which interstate relations are adjusted, or a manner of conduct. As such, diplomacy is practised by agents authorized to act on behalf of individual states or other recognised political entities. The question here is not about the nature of diplomacy, but whether diplomacy is relevant or irrelevant to, international order.¹⁰

Until the twentieth century, military means were seldom decisive. Diplomacy still had meaning and took the form of strategic diplomacy, or "... diplomatic content in which the goals of statesmen are not fully set and in which there are no rigidly established priorities among objectives".¹⁰ Diplomacy was strategically and effectively employed to effect important long range objectives. Today, political actors operate from a fused hierarchy of interests, and situations are analyzed in ideological and nationalistic terms, according to a fixed order of goal superordination and subordination. This hinders the use of diplomacy, relegating it to a form of tactical diplomacy. A situation ensues "... in which the goals of statesmen are rigidly set and in which priorities among objectives have been articulated and fixed".¹¹ As such, the role, employment and range of diplomacy is restricted to lesser, short-range outcomes, as a way to accommodate fixed objectives of states.¹²

The decline in the use of diplomacy as a strategic approach to peace, is aggravated by the central preoccupation of diplomatic methods with political warfare, and more specifically, diplomacy as international technical management. With the latter, the major concern is technical collaboration in order to maximise mutual interests and to find the most efficient means of achieving a given end, rather than the conciliation of different interests. This technical attitude obscures the reality that states do have different and conflicting interests. In its intrusion into the discus-

sion of strategic and security objectives, the technical use of diplomacy has relegated this instrument to a position of secondary importance, unable to bring about a re-ordering of state objectives in a conciliatory manner.¹⁹ Diplomacy has become a technical method rather than an approach to peace.

Clearly, as an approach to world peace, the importance of diplomacy has been greatly reduced. But this does not mean a complete disregard of the utility or advantages of diplomacy *per se*. The current intensity and frequency of diplomatic negotiations over the SWA-Namibia issue, indicates that the use of diplomacy has not completely disappeared. However, the lengthy diplomatic offensive has not produced the desired or acceptable conciliation of conflicting interests. On the contrary, the use of military means by all parties concerned, has increased.

Although the future success of the present diplomatic initiatives is still in the balance, the steady ascendancy of military instruments and the use of tactical diplomacy, is indicative of a corresponding decline in the regional use of strategic diplomacy.

4. THE ASCENDENCY OF MILITARY FORCE

Various instruments provide a background of assuredness and stability for diplomacy,²⁰ following the sound precept of *negotiation from strength*. Military means are potential foreign policy instruments in their own right. Beneath it, is understood any form of threat, or the application or use of military power, ultimately converging to actual war.²¹

The importance of the military instrument has been immortalized in the famous dictum of Clausewitz, that "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means."²² War is thus regarded as an instrument of policy, or in the view of Clausewitz, a rational instrument of national policy, and not a blind, impulsive or habitual exercise in violence.²³ As organized violence waged by political units, against other political units, war, like diplomacy, exemplifies the conduct of international relations by official agents. War is, therefore, regarded as normal in interstate relations.²⁴

As an instrument of policy, military force, and especially war, should not be seen in isolation. In relation to other instruments, diplomacy in particular, is of great importance. The generic relationship between diplomacy and military force has always been generally accepted. This interdependence of both and policies, however, implies the rational and instrumental use of force, solution, not to policy. Unfortunately, in practice an inverse relationship exists, as one ignores these two instruments. The failure or ineptness of the one, increases the importance of the other. The reduced importance and limited role accorded to diplomacy has resulted in the use of military instruments to a degree fringing on the dangerous and irrational. Instead of being the *ultima ratio*, the final or the unanswerable arbiter of international politics, when all other measures have failed, the military instrument has become the *prima ratio*. Diplomatic *raison d'être*, the way of good conduct in the international society, no longer plays a part anymore.²⁵

The military instrument is balanced by the view that increased destructive capability of military hardware, and the potential use of nuclear weapons and advanced military technology, has restricted the instrumental power of military force. This has been proved a fallacy. Although the quantity of nuclear weapons has increased, the policy options are numerous, as potentially could not, war has not been deprived of its potential value in absolute terms.²⁶ The effect, however, partly among

major powers has reduced the stabilizing effect of the nuclear level of strategy on the conventional, and Cold War levels. Accordingly, in areas outside the accepted zones of nuclear influence, the freedom of choice to use military force in a conventional or unconventional, albeit limited manner, still exists without any real fear of an uncontrollable escalation of conflict. In Southern Africa, as in most regions on the periphery of major power zones of influence, no real restrictions exist prohibiting the limited use of force as a political instrument. At most, the only obstacle, is international morality. Unfortunately, where objectives take on an absolutist nature, national interests take preference over moral impediments.

5. THE DANGER OF MILITARY EXCESSES

Antagonism and comity of interests are never fully separable in state interaction. Co-operation and conflict will always be combined.²¹⁷ A central issue is the importance of military force *vis-à-vis* that of other instruments, as well as the extent and intensity to which force can be used. Although an accepted instrument of policy, war should always be regarded as inappropriate.²¹⁸ Should war become necessary its magnitude must be in a reasonable accurate relation to the value of the objectives and amount of resistance to be met.²¹⁹ If an asymmetrical relation develops between the importance of the issue at stake and the magnitude of force used, the cost/risk in using military means could increase unacceptably. As it is difficult to assess objectively the threshold of cost ineffectiveness, the following guidelines serve as indications of the inappropriateness of military instruments.

The idea of war for war's sake, or war as the only efficient policy instrument, should be rejected. Adherence to this would be tantamount to a final acknowledgement of war being not so much a continuation of policy, as a failure or breakdown of policy. Military force is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. Victory is not the goal, but at most, a last resort to an alternative method by which consent can be achieved on preselected objectives.²²⁰ Again, war should not only be a response to local or regional imperatives, but be seen in its global context. While internal and regional destruction or dislocation are usually considered, a state's standing in world affairs is equally important. Not only does continued military involvement corrupt domestic and regional relations, but the global international system can be equally distorted.

A wide range of resource must be available to support a military oriented policy, both for short-term emergencies, and long-term policy objectives. A consequent and correct reservation of capabilities is necessary to avoid an over extension of available resources. Finally, the use of military means should never amount to a subordination, or disruption, of diplomacy. The use of military force, especially for strategic ends, is resort to a military policy as well. This could mean a total commitment to which domestic and international constraints, conventional restrictions like policy objectives, international obligations, and international law, do not apply, are ignored. Under these circumstances the use of diplomacy remains very far from a primary or sole means for purposes of international communication and cooperation.

6. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN SITUATION

In assessing the likelihood of these alternative policies on the use of force, it is necessary to consider the situation in the Southern African region. The

following aspects are worth mentioning. Although usually separated for analytical and political purposes, the two issues of SWA/Namibia and South Africa's internal policy form an interrelated whole when seen from the viewpoint of national security. This is confirmed by the perception of government and military spokesmen in South Africa that the alteration of the South African *status quo* is the ultimate aim of Communist expansionism, is subject to both issues. Similarly (but inversely), South Africa's attitude is in turn viewed by other regional actors as a major threat to their political independence. That is what South Africa's political and military presence in SWA/Namibia, its offensive against SWAPO and the ANC, and its alleged political and logistic support of dissident movements in Angola and Mozambique, as threats to internal and regional stability.

As a result, with mutual security considerations in mind, objectives have taken on a dual nature. All parties claim that the use of military force serves a just purpose. South Africa regards it as necessary to maintain a regional balance of power, to quash the excesses of Communist expansionism. Other regional groups see independence as a guarantee of their political independence and freedom from external domination. The effect of this interplay of force which negotiations and bargaining take place, it is according to the above-mentioned author, is a 'visible sign' mixed motive action.¹⁰ Because the parties to the diplomatic bargaining are irreconcilable, the controversy will close by the use of military force as the only unambiguous outcome.

The South African government and internal interests groups of SWA/Namibia, and SWAPO expanded by the frontline states, have both issued explicit statements to the effect, stating a political settlement unacceptable to the other party. The former demand internal freedom of action and the absence of interference have increased to a degree that the role of diplomacy as a political instrument is questioned. Presently, the situation is thus, by the creation of an atmosphere conducive to a political settlement, brought about by the specific initiatives of the Reagan administration.

However, completion of the current task, an objective assessment cannot be made. The military role of the use of military force is limited. At present, the political issue has escalated considerably. It has reached a point where SWAPO is presently at the stage of 'total war' against the South African government. The current phase of escalation, according to the author, is the SWAPO attempt to overthrow the present South African government. Such a political move requires the overthrow of the apartheid system, and could lead to a conflict with the South African government and government. The current situation has been described by the author as a 'total war' situation. At the moment, the situation is thus, by the creation of an atmosphere conducive to a political settlement, brought about by the specific initiatives of the Reagan administration.

The political opening of a political settlement, brought about by the specific initiatives of the Reagan administration, is the current situation.

Minister of Defence, his comments on this issue had no specific reference to any particular neighbour of South Africa, but did not exclude the use of military operations similar to those in Angola, against any participants in such a scheme. Although South Africa endorses the principle of peaceful co-existence, national security is a higher priority, and she expects neighbouring states to refrain from providing facilities to dissident movements supporting insurgency in South Africa.²⁸ Such an expectation seems unrealistic in the light of the continued reciprocal military build-up between South Africa and the externally supported Angola, Botswana and Mocambique.²⁹ There is too, the worsening of non-military relations between South Africa and Black states in the region, and the recent establishment of a new Southern African Anti-Apartheid Movement in Salisbury. This movement has as its primary aim the co-ordination of financial, political and military support for ANC, PAC and SWAPO actions against South Africa and SWA/Namibia.³⁰ Finally, there exists the ever-increasing major power involvement by proxy in the political-military situation of Southern Africa. The possibility of collective conventional military action, is enhanced by the legitimacy accorded to these actions by organizations such as the OAU and the UN, and host countries. It is anticipated too that South Africa will take preventive measures.

In conclusion, though still short of conventional or high intensity military warfare, the military situation and conflict potential in Southern Africa is a cause of grave concern. Although the current and expected use of military force does not necessarily imply a complete denial of the use of diplomacy, diplomatic initiatives will continue to decline should the present negotiations in SWA/Namibia fail to produce an acceptable settlement. Such a failure will strengthen the resolve of all parties to use military means as an equal alternative. The foundation for such a possibility is already in the process of being laid.

7. CONCLUSION

When we take into account the situation as sketched out for Military force (above) it is very important for the purpose of this study. It is considered extremely difficult to produce accommodation without the invasion and entrenchment of military forces. When diplomacy has succeeded in producing a solution, it is very often the result of a combination of political phenomena and military considerations. This is the case in the present South African policy towards the bordering African States. Diplomacy is not only regarded by all as the approach to a peaceful solution, and stability, but it always carries as a political condition the suppression of military action. The conclusion is that in a region where military action is a constant possibility, the requirements of military strategy.

It should not be forgotten that the above-mentioned examples that have appeared in this study are not the only ones that have occurred in the past. The study is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of the history of the region, but rather a study of the military situation in the region.

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LANTIN 12 RICHARDS BAY COAL BERTH DOUBLED

Pretoria SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST in English 12 Mar 82 p 24

(Text)

Candac's R48-million contract awarded on January 3, to double the length of the Richards Bay coal berth is going according to plan. Caissons for the new 700 m jetty extension are being laid at a rate of one every three weeks. The totally marine-type operation necessitated Candac having to recruit its team from its offices in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban. Candac has already built five similar quays, all along the South African coast.

The new quay, a vibrant extension to the previous one, will be made up entirely of caissons, 25 m in length, a quay wall 10 m long. Each caisson is 26 m long and 26 m high and 15.5 m wide.

The caissons are laid in a regular pattern, 17.2 m apart at a time in the floating dock, and with the dock water level rising, are then floated into position. The dock water comes up from Saldanha Bay, after being pumped by Candac. It was towed by three tugs, and the work was done in a steady eight-hour shift. The equipment required for the job, including the two main tugs, "Cape" and "Popeye", the 275-tonne barges and the "Paradise" tug, are being used.

The laying of the caissons was completed in the second week in August. The first caisson was laid on the first group, 100 m long. The second caisson was the second, laying in the water. The third caisson is moved to the fourth position.

of which 100 m has been allocated to Candac for this contract. By the time the job is finished, the 35 caissons will have taken 1 964 m³ of concrete and 132 t of steel. The slide form itself, which weighs 115 t, is lifted from the caissons and placed onto the dock for each new slide by a massive gantry, especially made for the job. This is stationed on the existing quay wall and counterweighted with 600 t of ballast blocks.

Reclaimed area

Work has also got into gear on the 50 ha stretch of swamp that is to be reclaimed behind the jetty wall, an area that is almost 100 per cent bog. Although the sand here is relatively firm, there are always soft patches, and there is a constant danger of plant blowing down and being caught by the tide. Fortunately, the swamp bush has not had to be uprooted but simply cut off its base.

By far the largest sum of money (R32 million, as compared with Candac's R12 million for their work) will of course go not to Candac but to their many sub-contractors, a consortium known as RB2 and made up of H&M (aka Hellenische Aannemings Maatschappij), with whom Candac has worked for some 15 years on other jobs, and Thedding International, for whom this is their first commercial assignment. By the time the contract is completed, some 6 000 730 m³ of soil will have been moved.

Dredgers invaluable

The dredgers' first cut is to 18 m

and removes most of the loose silt. A second cut takes the sea bed down to -19 m and consists mainly of silt and stone. The area in front of the quay has already been dredged to 19 m and Candac, therefore, has a good working area here.

The contract time for the project is three years, which Candac Contracts Director, Marine Works, Mr. Ted Maltby recently described as "not too tight but by no means a piece of cake". Turn-over on the contract as a whole should peak at about R2 million per month.

Candac are building up to some 200 men on this job.

1. Caisson ready for sea-slide out of the Saldok.

2. The caisson in the Saldok at full height, ready for floating off and final sliding in the sea.

REF: 4700/1037

THREE JOHANNESBURG ESCAPED 'TERRORIST'

JOHANNESBURG THE CITIZEN in English 3 Apr 68 pp 1, 2

Article by Sandra Lieberman

[Cont.]

THREE Johannesburg men were yesterday jailed for an effective one year each for finding a temporary hiding place for a person described as a danger to society—who was serving eight years for terrorist activity—after he escaped from Pretoria Central Prison at the same time as terrorists Alexander Mombani and Timothy Jenkin.

Stephen Bernard Lee fled South Africa after his December 1972 escape and has never been reapprehended. The Johannesburg Regional court was told yesterday by the prosecution.

This was at the trial of laboratory manager Ronald Jenkin (31) of Beyer, Pionne Naidoo (37) a maintenance fitter, and Farish Nakabhai (44) — clothing salesman.

All three pleaded guilty to a charge of contravening the Prison Act by aiding Lee between December 11 and December 20 1972.

None of them testified. Affidavits by the State were read in support by their legal counsel.

The Magistrate Mr. J. J. Luthy, accepted

that the three had no prior knowledge of the escape and had not assisted in the escape.

The facts as revealed in the court through the affidavits were that Nakabhai was contacted and told that Stephen Lee had escaped and was waiting on a bar the Johannesburg Hotel in Twist Street.

Nakabhai had known the person Lee and "I felt I should attempt to assist him in his time of need."

He in turn contacted Naidoo. Naidoo did not know Lee. Naidoo was friendly with Nakabhai. The latter asked Naidoo if he could provide him accommodation or 1000 rands for Lee. He was unable to do so immediately but the following day provided Nakabhai with a northern suburb address.

At no time did Naidoo see or talk to Lee.

Nakabhai and Naidoo said since the incident they had not seen or communicated with Lee.

The statement made by Jenkin advised that until about 1972 Stephen Lee had been a close friend of his brother and his family.

He had visited Lee but had covered and do not live in Johannesburg from where he

took him to a Germiston hotel. He gave Lee money for overnight accommodation.

The following day he supplied Lee with money and clothing. A meeting was then called to make further arrangements. Michael Jenkin did not attend the meeting.

"When approached by a friend of his brother he was moved to render some assistance to him — this might be unlawful but is only human", the defence counsel said.

The court was further told that the accused "did not render assistance in this regard to further the cause".

Jenkin and Naidoo had no previous convictions. Nakabhai admitted serving a 10-year jail sentence after being the first case tried in South Africa in terms of the Sabotage Act. He was released in 1973.

Defence for Nakabhai told the court that the accused was related to a prominent Johannesburg attorney who had been in practice for about 30 years and who was married to the accused's sister.

All these circumstances had led to Nakabhai becoming a

changed man after his release from prison when he married and is now the father of a child.

Michael Jenkin's counsel conceded to the court "that the sort of person assisted by Jenkin was in fact a danger to society".

In mitigation he said that Jenkin's children were very young, the baby being only four months at the time of his detention some two months ago. When detained Jenkin's wife took up employment and had been forced to employ a nanny.

Prior to the passing of sentence the magistrate warned the crowded public gallery, filled with students, relations and friends, that they were to remain where they were until the court adjourned after the passing of sentence and that "any person who disrupts the proceedings of this court will be dealt with appropriately".

The magistrate said it was the opinion of the court that it was not a lesser offence to assist an escaped person as it was to assist in the escape of a person.

He said all three accused were aware at the

time of the offence that Stephen Lee had been sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for crimes of a nature that could harm the State.

"It is obviously in the interest of society that a person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment should serve it. It is also in the interest of society that persons should not assist in escapes or render assistance to escapees.

"It is most probable that in the case of Jenkin he felt himself morally obliged to assist Lee."

The magistrate took into account that the assistance was rendered by all three for only a brief period.

All three were sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

Of this, two years for each was conditionally suspended for five years. The court had taken into account that all three had been in custody for about three months.

At the passing of sentence, Michael Jenkin almost collapsed. At the same time the crowd yelled "Amandla" (Power to the people) and some gave Black power salutes.

As the magistrate

left the court room, the orderly took the elbow of one of the two Indian accused to indicate that the prisoners should proceed to the cells. The Citizen was unable to see whether the accused stumbled or was pushed but he fell on the stairs leading from the centre of the court room down to the cells below.

The crowd roared disapproval and an elderly woman yelled: "Don't push my child around".

After the three had been taken away the court room remained packed for a considerable time.

A while after the incident it came to the attention of The Citizen that the magistrate who had presided at the trial had become aware of the incident and inquired into its circumstances.

Mr I J J Luther was on the Bench. Mr J D Pretorius presided. Advocate D Kruze appeared for N. du Toit and N. du Toit, and Advocate J. H. Engelbrecht defended Michael Jenkin.

● A police spokesman said yesterday the three men have originally been detained in connection with another case and it only then appeared that they had been involved in the escape.

TOYOTA THREE-YEAR EXPANSION PLAN REPORTED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Apr 82 p 31

[Article by Don Wilkinson]

[Text]

OVER the next three years, Toyota South Africa intends to spend some R70-million "in order to remain competitive," says chairman Dr Albert Wessels in his annual statement with the group's accounts for 1981.

The money will be used to acquire model-related tooling to meet the local content programme on new and replacement models, on expansion of the Sandton office complex, and on general manufacturing extensions, innovations, replacements and rearrangements aimed at efficiency.

Finances are unlikely to be a problem — the group has little long or short-term debt — and on the longer view the capex is inevitable if the group wishes to maintain its market share.

Not that everything is rosy for the country's automotive industry. Dr Wessels expects interest rates to remain "abnormally high," and the rand to stay weak while the dollar and yen stay strong, with a consequent adverse effect on the group's competitiveness because of its dearer imports — which not even Toyota's forex expertise will be able to counteract fully, one presumes.

Toyota's chairman's forecast of the vehicle market size — about 12 percent down on 1981 — is generally in line with his competitors' views, but he expects the group's market share to rise, though this need not produce higher profits because of the pressure on margins.

The uncertainty over future oil prices and supplies, he feels, should buoy up demand for the smaller vehicles in which the group specialises.

Traditionally, Toyota's dividend cover is high, though last year's 6.9 times after Lifo for the 115c paid was exceptional, like 1980.

While this would seem to rule out any dividend cut, longer memories go back to the savage cut in the 1977 payment, however well shareholders have fared since.

At yesterday's 1 100c, the return is 10,5 percent, well below what can be obtained from many of the distributors and franchise companies in the motor list, but none the less worth holding on to for the longer term.

BRIEFS

NEW NAVAL TRAINING SQUADRON--CAPE TOWN--A new training squadron was established and a training vessel, the SAS Kaapstad, was commissioned at a ceremony at Simonstown yesterday. Commissioning the SAS Kaapstad for the training programme, the Chief of the Navy, Vice-Admiral R A Edwards, said it was essential that the navy keep pace with the latest technological developments. Valuable manpower and ships were allocated to run the training squadron because warships were expensive to keep at sea and the number of hours they were used in an operational role was limited. The time they could afford to spend on elementary training was therefore restricted. Operational ships would spend all spare time on advanced training and the development of procedures and tactics. The purpose of the training squadron was to provide practical navigation and seamanship training and to serve as an introduction to life at sea, he said. The training squadron, which at present consists of the SAS Kaapstad and Navigator, will be increased in size when the SAS Pretoria joins the squadron later this year. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Apr 82 p 3]

KOEBERG SHOOTING INCIDENT--CAPE TOWN--Two security guards at the Koeberg nuclear power station died after shooting incidents at the plant on Thursday night. The police liaison officer for the Boland, major George Kershoff, said yesterday that a senior security guard, Mr B A Visser, 28, of Bresford Street, Duinefontein, was approached by a junior guard who was part of a group Mr Visser was detailing for duty. The junior guard said: "I have been looking for you for a long time." Three shots were fired and Mr Visser was hit in the chest and stomach. He died on the way to hospital. Major Kershoff said the second guard died after he had been shot in the head. The man's identity is being withheld until his relatives have been informed. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Apr 82 p 5]

CP DIVISIONAL COUNCIL--WITBANK--Eight-hundred people attended the first meeting of the Conservative Party in Witbank on Wednesday night. The member of Parliament for Jeppe, Mr Koos van der Merwe, addressed the meeting. Dr W Snyman, chairman of the National Party read a letter to the audience stating the reasons for his resignation from the NP, why he had joined the Conservative Party and pledging support for Dr A P Treurnicht. More than half of the old divisional council of the NP followed Dr Snyman and joined the Conservative party. A divisional council under the chairmanship of Dr Snyman was elected. Mr van der Merwe said the party had collected more than R100 000

to battle for its principles. "The movement away from Mr P W Botha's party is growing and all over the country a new political awareness, as well as awareness of the present NP, is apparent," he said. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 2 Apr 82 p 3]

BARLOWS ACQUIRES FIRMS--In a series of share swaps involving several hundred million rands, the Barlows group of companies will acquire control of Tiger Oats and Imperial Cold Storage, two of the country's largest basic food organisations. Tiger Oats began as a milling concern and has since branched out into a wide range of food products, while ICS concentrates on meat. The deals involve the creation of a new company called Tiger-Sugar which will be listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Its main assets will be Tiger Oats itself and the sugar interests of C G Smith, a conglomerate in the Barlows group with controlling stakes in the carpet and textile company Romatex, and Nampak in packaging. Also concerned in the various transactions is the Old Mutual, a large shareholder in Tiger and ICS, whose interest in Barlows will rise to almost 25 percent of that group's ordinary capital. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Apr 82 p 2]

SECTION 6 DETAINEES--A total of 85 people were presently detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act and seven under Section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act, the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, said yesterday. Replying to a question by Mrs Helen Suzman (PFP Houghton), he said 60 of the Section 6 prisoners had been detained for longer than three months, the two longest-held detainees having been held for 183 days. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Apr 82 p 4]

STOLEN CARS--From the beginning of August to the end of December last year, 14 810 motor vehicles valued at R82,9-million were reported stolen, the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, said. Replying to a question by Mr Harry Schwarz (PFP Yeoville), he said of these 5 866 had been recovered undamaged, 2 260 were damaged, and 590 were in a cannibalised condition. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 3 Apr 82 p 4]

STEEL EXPORTS BOOSTED--South Africa's steel exports to the west coast of South America were boosted in January with the shipment of 12 000 tonnes of round bars to Chile in a vessel chartered by Unicorn Lines on behalf of Macsteel international (Pty) Limited. This, believed to be the largest single shipment ever to be sent from South Africa, was an export order obtained by Macsteel International, South Africa's largest privately-owned steel company. The steel will be used in the manufacture of grinding balls, and essential item in crushing plants for the extraction of copper. Mr Dennis Gray, export director of Macsteel, said that the steel export business in South America had been built up over the past five years in close conjunction with Unicorn. "Against severe competition, we have exported in most years well over 10 000 tonnes to the five west coast countries--Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia, as the sole suppliers of Iscor steel to this part of the world," said Mr Gray. In 1979 Macsteel was instrumental in obtaining an order of 15 000 tonnes of steel reinforcing bar for Peru, the largest single shipment ever exported to that country. Mr Gray said that export markets would continue to be tough in the next year or two. "But South African steel is of consistently

high quality and this should stand us in good stead in the competitive environment particularly as we have now built up a nucleus of loyal buyers in South America." [Text] [Pretoria SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST in English 12 Mar 82 p 11]

RESEARCHER RECOGNIZED--The Council of the South African Chemical Institute has awarded the Raikes Medal for 1981 to Dr Terence Ashworth of the National Chemical Research Laboratory of the CSIR for his pioneering research in developing a series of ruthenium compounds. The prestigious Raikes Medal is available for award annually to a chemist under 35 years of age whose work shows outstanding promise, as indicated by his/her published work. In addition, the work must have been carried out in the Republic of South Africa and have been published in a recognized journal. Dr Ashworth's research activities in the field of organometallic chemistry and homogeneous catalysis have already led to the publication of 39 papers in international journals. He pioneered in the development of a series of ruthenium compounds which showed highly unusual reactivity for this metal and these discoveries indicated that ruthenium may replace more expensive platinum metals (e.g. rhodium) in certain industrial processes employing homogeneous catalysts. Ruthenium, one of the platinum metals mined in the Republic, has a limited use in the chemicals industry at present. These researches could lead to a better utilization of this metal. The award will be made at a special function of the South African Chemical Institute on June 4 at the CSIR Conference Centre when Dr Ashworth will present a paper on some highlights of his work. [Text] [Pretoria SOUTH AFRICAN DIGEST in English 12 Mar 82 p 10]

CSO: 4700/1037

AIDE CITED ON AFRICAN ISSUES

PM070953 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26-27 Mar 82 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Salim: It was Necessary"]

[Text] The situation in Southern Africa, the followup to Cancun, and the SDAR's admission to the OAU were the main subjects of an interview granted by Tanzanian Foreign Minister Salim to APS.

In reply to an initial question on the developments in the political and military situation in Southern Africa, especially after the recent creation of the frontline countries' coordination council, Mr Salim Ahmad Salim first expressed satisfaction at the African countries' collective support which, he stressed, "strengthens the frontline states' position in face of South African aggression."

"It is support," he said, "which is a step toward the consolidation of our position in face of South Africa, on the one hand. On the other hand, with regard to Namibia, it is necessary to mention the problems being encountered in SWAPO's struggle against the South African challenge which, moreover, is being shown outside Namibia, especially by the de facto occupation of the southern part of Angola, by the actions to destabilize some frontline states (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and Lesotho) not to mention Pretoria's support for the mercenaries in the aggression against the Seychelles."

Asked how Africa's support could be demonstrated to counter the maneuvers of the "five-member contact group," the Tanzanian foreign minister said he thinks that Africa's efforts should constantly pursue two parallel objectives: "First," he pointed out, "those efforts should constantly aim to support the armed liberation struggle which SWAPO is waging and that of the frontline countries which are particularly exposed, like Angola. Second, at the diplomatic level, Africa should exert all the pressure it can on the contact group countries, which must succeed in influencing South Africa with a view to reaching a negotiated solution to the Namibian problem on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 435 on this question."

Questioned on the followup to Cancun, Salim Ahmad Salim said he thinks that "the hopes placed in that conference, which at the outset were considerable, were quickly dashed because we expected global negotiations to be started and they have not taken place, at a time when the developing countries' problems

are constantly being accentuated as a result of the international economic crisis. The latent discontent is now more acute."

[Question] Who is responsible for that? The rich countries?

"Of course," the Tanzanian minister replied. "We want the international economic system to be restructured, and it is some of the rich countries which are resisting that restructuring."

With regard to the SDAR's admission, Salim Ahmad Salim said that "the SDAR's admission as 51st OAU member was necessary and had to happen some time. It is a logical development and that is why I think that the 38th Council of Ministers session which has just been held in Addis Ababa was an important and historic session owing to its far-reaching decisions."

CSO: 4719/789

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